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Interests in Artificial Intelligence (AI) have grown tremendously over the 
past decade but research in the area has been painfully slow and difficult. One of the 
areas where there has been a significant amount of progress is in the building of so-
called "expert systems", computer programs which are intended to give advice at 
near professional level of competence. Expert systems have enjoyed a particularly 
high level of acceptance in medicine but there are no widely used legal expert 
systems due to the late introduction of lawyers to computing technology, 
particularly lawyers practicing common law outside of North America. 
This is also true in Hong Kong. While addressing judges and lawyers at the 
January 11，1993 ceremony at City Hall, the Chief Justice, Sir Ti Liang Yang, 
marked the opening of this Legal year by saying that he saw the introduction of 
information technology as an important step in getting away from old-fashioned, 
labor intensive legal systems and moving into a new era. 
So in this project, a prototype legal expert system was built on a specific 
area of tort law，namely product/service liability which is gaining importance in the 
Hong Kong legal environment as consumer protection is being emphasized. The 
system, by no means, can replace the lawyers but will assist them in analyzing 
product/service liability cases and make preliminary assessments on the liability of 
the defendant in a more consistent and flexible way. 
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There is a widespread misconception that law is a simple system of rules and 
that legal inference consists of a simple deductive application of these rules. Thus 
lawyers can easily be replaced by computer expert systems that are mostly rule-
based and that perform a better job than the human experts. However, any lawyer 
can point out the extent to which this misconception has missed the reality of the 
nature of law. In this project, a prototype legal expert system was constructed to 
illustrate some of the steps in building an expert system and the difficulties in 
building an expert system on case law were explored as well. 
Concepts of Expert Systems 
DeHnition 
"Expert systems" are computer programs which perform complex tasks at a 
level which is at or near the level expected of a human expert. The development of 
expert systems is a direct outgrowth of research conducted over the past thirty years 
in the subject known as "Artificial Intelligence" (Al)--that branch of computer 
science which is directed toward making computers more "intelligent".1 
An expert system is capable of representing and reasoning about some 
knowledge-rich domain，such as internal medicine or geology, with a view to 
iAlan Tyree (1989). Expert Systems in Law. Sydney: Prentice Hall, p.l. 
2 
solving problems and giving advice. It can be distinguished from other kinds of 
artificial intelligence program in that: 
- it deals with jsubject matter of realistic complexity that normally 
requires a considerable amount of human expertise; 
- it must exhibit high performance in terms of speed and reliability in 
order to be a useful tool; 
、':.:‘ it must be capable of explaining and justifying solutions and 
recommendations in order to convince the user that its reasoning is, 
in fact, correct.2 
2Peter Jackson (1986). INTRODUCTION TO EXPERT SYSTEMS. Wokingham (UK): 
Addison-Wesley, p.l. (夂 
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Components of Expert Systems 
Figure 1 
n 1 • 
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Source: Efraim Turban (1988). DECISION SUPPORT AND EXPERT SYSTEMS MANAGERIAL 
PERSPECTIVES. New York: Macmillan, p.353. 
As shown in the above diagram, a sophisticated expert system consists of the 
following components:3 
1. The Knowledge Base 
Using the facts and special heuristics stored in the knowledge base, 
an expert system can understand, formulate and solve problems in a 
particular domain. 
2. Working memory 
This is the place the expert system stores the description of a current 
problem, as specified by the input data and for recording intermediate 
results. 
3Efraim Turban(1988 .^ DECISION SUPPORT AND EXPERT SYSTEMS MANAGERIAL 
PERSPECTIVES. New York: Macmillan, p.354-356. — 
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3. The Inference Engine 
As the "brain" of the expert system，the inference engine provides a 
methodology for reasoning about the information in the knowledge base and 
in the working memory, and for formulating conclusions. 
4. User Interface 
Expert systems contain a language processor for friendly, problem-
oriented communications between the user and the computer. 
5. Explanation Subsystem (Justifier) 
With the ability to trace responsibility for conclusions to their 
sources, an expert system can answer how a certain conclusion is reached, 
why a certain alternative is rejected or what the plan to reach the solution is, 
etc. 
Knowledge Acquisition 
In order for the Expert System to attain a level close to human experts' 
intelligence, specific knowledge in a domain needs to be acquired and represented in 
the computer. By referencing the stored data and using certain inferencing 
techniques, the reasoning process of the human experts is mimicked. 
The first step, knowledge acquisition，is the on-going process of building 
the knowledge content of expert systems—the knowledge base. There are three main 
sources of knowledge: literature, experts and examples.4 In certain domains such as 
4Peter Sell (1985). EXPERT SYSTEMS-A PRACTICAL INTRODUCTION. London: 
Macmillan, p.28. 
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science, knowledge is written down in codified form. Building knowledge base 
from these domains can be easily started by reviewing literature. 
However, most expert systems are constructed for domains that do not have 
written down knowledge. In that case, the knowledge engineer needs to rely on 
human experts for their accumulated wealth of experience. This approach is often 
being criticized because experts are hard to identify due to the imprecise definition 
of an expert. Sometimes, the expert may not be able to verbalize the knowledge that 
he uses. In fact, the expert may not even be aware of the rules by which he solves a 
problem; his knowledge exists at a subconscious level. Although this method is 
error-proned, most knowledge-based systems are still built using interviewing and 
literature search techniques. 
To overcome the above problem and to use the experts for what they are 
really good at, namely generating or scrutinizing examples, a technique called 
induction can be employed for a database of examples. Induction is a reasoning 
process in which conclusions are drawn from particular instances or facts. Further 
elaboration of this technique is beyond the scope of this project. Interested readers 
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Source: Townsend C., MASTERING EXPERT SYSTEMS WITH TURBO PROLOG. 
Howard W. Sams & Company, First Edition, 1986，p. 120. 
Once knowledge is acquired, a knowledge representation model translates 
the abstract knowledge to forms that can be understood by computers, as indicated 
in Figure 2 above. 
Among various models, there are two fundamentally different methods to 
represent knowledge acquired to the computer: as program—procedural or as data-
declarative. Though procedural representation is highly efficient, there are three 
main sources of dissatisfaction with procedural encoding :5 the representation is 
rather opaque because knowledge is embedded in code and its meaning is not only 
hard to perceive but also suffers from the ills of context-dependence. Due to the 
5Peter Sell (1985、• EXPERT SYSTEMS—A PRACTICAL INTRODUCTION. London: 
Macmillan, p.33. 
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combined effects of opacity and context-dependence, systems with procedural 
representation are hard to understand and hard to modify. 
In addition, procedural representation lacks "referential transparency", 
meaning that the variables take on different values during execution uncontrollably. 
Programs written in procedural languages such as Pascal often fail to achieve a high 
degree of referential transparency. The following is an example of such a program 
written in Pascal: 
program example; 
var flag : boolean; 
function f(n: integer) : integer; 
begin 
if flag then f: =n 
else f: =0; 







When the program is executed, the first output is 10 while the second output 
is zero. This shows that the procedural nature of Pascal makes program lines 
dependent on each other. 
The same thing cannot be said about declarative representation. Declarative 
encoding records knowledge as data and is easy to understand and modify. Above 
all, data is context-independent. There are many forms of declarative 
representations: propositional logic, predicate logic, semantic networks, analog 
representations, frames, semantic triples, production rules, to mention a few. 
Production rules are among the most popular forms used because of its close 
resemblance to human cognitive processes. Each rule is a condition-action pair, e.g. 
8 
IF condition THEN action. The condition is evaluated with reference to the database 
of facts and, if fulfilled, the action is performed. 
Inference Engine 
Since the representation method of production rules are more prominent, the 
following discussion of reasoning will mainly assume that this method is used. 
Under a production rule-based expert system, there are two primary approaches to 
controlling the process of inferencing: backward chaining and forward chaining. 
In a backward chaining system, a goal is assumed. The system works 
backward from the goal trying to prove it from the facts in the database or from 
knowledge supplied during the consultation. This strategy works reasonably well 
when the number of outcomes is relatively limited and the amount of input 
knowledge is very large. Backward chaining systems are often called goal-directed 
systems.6 Most expert systems written in Prolog are backward chaining systems. 
If the number of possible conclusions is large and the amount of input 
information is relatively small, forward chaining is more appropriate. In this case, 
premises of rules are examined against the information to see if the conclusions are 
true. If so, the conclusion is added to the database and the cycle repeats. As a 
result, forward chaining systems are called data-driven systems.7 
6Carl Townsend (1986). MASTERING EXPERT SYSTEMS WITH TURBO PROLOG. 1st 
ed. Indianapolis: Howard W. Sams & Company, p. 139. 
7Ibid., p. 140. 
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BeneHts of Expert Systems 
The reason why Expert Systems (ES) is receiving so much attention is that it 
can provide major benefits to users, such as: 
1. Active role _ By actively questioning the user, the expert system ensures 
that important aspects of the problem are not overlooked.8 
2. Perfect memory - an expert system never forgets any aspect of a problem. 
In situation with large amount of information, a human may simply 
overlook something. So a perfect memory is sometimes a good 
substitute for both intelligence and knowledge. 
3. Increased Output - ES can work faster than humans. Increased output 
means fewer workers needed and reduced costs.9 
4. Increased Quality - ES can increase quality by providing consistent advice 
and reducing error rate. 
8Alan Tyree (1989). Expert Systems in Law. Sydney: Prentice Hall, p.6. 
9Efraim Turban(1988). DECISION SUPPORT AND EXPERT SYSTEMS MANAGERIAL 
PERSPECTIVES. New York: Macmillan, p.360. 
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5. Working with Incomplete and Uncertain Information - The user can 
usually give a "don't know" or "not sure" answer to one or more of 
the system's questions during a consultation, and the expert system 
will still produce an answer qualified by a certainty value.10 
Recent Development 
In 1985, there were over 50 expert systems reported to be in use and the 
number was rapidly increasing.11 The most notable expert systems are MYCIN, 
PROSPECTOR and XCON. Developed jointly by the medical and AI communities 
at the Standford University in 1970s, MYCIN can assist a physician who is not an 
expert in the field of antibiotics with the diagnosis and treatment of blood 
infections.12 PROSPECTOR was developed at the Standford Research Institute from 
1978 onwards. It is a computer-based consulting system designed to aid geologists 
in their search for ore deposits and in their evaluation of the mineral potential of 
large geographic areas.13 XCON was developed at the Carnegie-Mellon University 
at the request of Digital Equipment Corporation. It configures large VAX computer 
systems by first checking that the order is complete and then determining the spatial 
arrangement of components (usually 50-150 of them).14 
10Efraim Turban(1988). DECISION SUPPORT AND EXPERT SYSTEMS 
MANAGERIAL PERSPECTIVES. New York: Macmillan, p.362. 
nPeter Sell (1985). EXPERT SYSTEMS-A PRACTICAL INTRODUCTION. London: 
Macmillan, p.7. 
12Peter Jackson (1986). INTRODUCTION TO EXPERT SYSTEMS. Wokingham (UK): 
Addison-Wesley, p.95. 
13Peter Sell (1985). EXPERT SYSTEMS—A PRACTICAL INTRODUCTION. London: 
Macmillan, p.9. 
14Peter Jackson (1986). INTRODUCTION TO EXPERT SYSTEMS. Wokingham (UK): 
Addison-Wesley, p. 126. 
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Expert Systems in Law 
Applications 
If there are computer programs which can diagnose bacterial diseases and 
recommend treatment, advise on likely places to drill for oil and perform 
complicated computer configuration, then surely it should be possible to write 
programs which would give expert legal advice.15 Although there are currently no 
large-scale programs such as MYCIN that deals with legal issues, there are several 
smaller legal expert systems in operation. One example is the Trade Practices 
"screening" program which screens would-be clients whose problems do not fall 
within a particular section of the Australian Trade Practices Act 1974. This 
inexpensive and effective computer program saves the human experts—the lawyers-
tremendous amount of valuable time in screening out clients.16 
Legal expert systems differ from other expert systems in a fundamental way. 
Usually, explanation and justification are provided in the other systems as a means 
of establishing the user's confidence in the advice given by the system. By contrast, 
a legal system provides the justification, i.e. the reasoning process, as one of its 
major products. The user of a legal expert system, particularly if a professional, 
may care little for the prediction of the system, but the reasons provided for the 
prediction could be useful even if the predictions were always wrong. If a expert 
system can provide good arguments, then these are useful as a product in 
themselves.17 




Problems of Expert Systems with Case Law 
Translation of cases 
Although it may be relatively easy to build an advice-giving system which 
will cope with statute law, when statute law is considered in its raw form, methods 
for dealing with the complexities of case law are less obvious. Due to the 
characteristic of case law, a judge tries to find applicable principles from previous 
cases and apply them to the facts of the current case. Clearly, any viable method 
will demand a considerable amount of "translation" of those previous cases into 
forms which may be used by a program. It is presently not possible to automatically 
extract the meaning of a case from its text; this is really the problem of 
communicating with a computer using a natural language, and it is a problem which 
is very far from solution.18 
Representation of cases 
Furthermore, most forms of knowledge representation characterize each case 
by its facts and "rules" , both of which are relatively simple-minded approaches to 
decided cases and both have come in for substantial and justifiable criticism from 
legal realists.19 This problem has put a severe limitation on the capability of legal 
expert systems in reasoning with case law. 




Another problem is the interpretation of a body of case law which is an 
activity known to be difficult both at the theoretical and practical level. Virtually 
every law school in the Common Law world devotes a very significant amount of 
time to developing the skills necessary to extract the law from a series of cases 
which may be remote in time and in jurisdiction both from each other and from the 
present. Yet, according to the methods of the common law, principles are to be 
extracted from the cases and it is there that law is to be found.20 
To further complicate the interpretation issue, non-lawyer ES builders should 
note that even well-documented laws may be interpreted differently in different 
legislative context, which will not come as a surprise for lawyers knowledgeable in 
the field.21 The meaning of a case is not to be determined merely from the text of 
the case but rather from the entire body of legal materials. The meaning of a case, 
or indeed of a word in a statute, might change over time as the body of basic legal 
materials changes; there is a constant need to interpret and reinterpret fundamental 
legal source material.22 
Policy considerations 
Builders of legal expert systems should also be warned that there is a 
multiplicity of technical legal tools available for avoiding what would initially 
appear to be the outcome dictated by a body of case law. These tools range from 
distinguishing cases on the basis of facts which are said to be "relevant", to 
technical considerations of the degree of "persuasiveness" that a decision from some 
20Alan Tyree (1989). Expert Systems in Law. Sydney: Prentice Hall, p. 109-110. 
21Ibid.，p.135. 
22Ibid., p. 136-137. 
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other jurisdiction should be accorded. However, these tools which the lawyers call 
policy considerations are good candidates for a production rule-based expert system, 
since when they are articulated, they often seem to fall naturally into a rule type 
structure.23 
Reasoning with precedent 
Doctrine of precedent 
Besides the above mentioned problems, the main obstacle to building 
computer models in areas with substantial amount of case law is the problem of 
precedent. The difficulty here, as every lawyer knows, is that precedent is a very 
fluid concept and that the layman's view that each case stands for a simple rule 
which may then be applied in a mechanical fashion is simply untrue.24 
In the simplest form, the doctrine of precedent holds that each case contains 
a rule of law known as the ratio decidendi. This rule of law is as binding on later 
inferior courts as a rule in a statute book. In this simple theory, it is only necessary 
to examine the ratio decidendi of those cases which are binding on the court, see if 
they apply to the facts in the dispute before the court and make the decision 
accordingly.25 
But the problem is that this simple theory does not work. Judges always have 
some leeway of choice in the application of case law. It was argued by one of the 
greatest legal scholars that this is due to the different methods which may be used to 
23Alan Tyree (1989). Expert Systems in Law. Sydney: Prentice Hall, p.111. 
24Ibid., p. 12. 
25Ibid., p. 136. 
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find the ratio decidendi of a case and difficulties of determining which facts are 
material and therefore directly determine which previous cases might be similar. 
Rule Model 
The rule-based model does not seem to handle precedent too well either. The 
reasons for this are not entirely clear, but it seems that if a lawyer uses "rules" at all 
when handling precedent, then they are rules which vary immensely in generality. 
The rules would probably contain hypotheses such as "If the facts of the older case 
are stated at an appropriate level of generality" and "If the facts of the older case 
are legally similar" . The conclusions of precedent rules would be of the form "the 
present case is supported by the older case" and "the present case needs to be 
distinguished from the older case". This would imply that the expert system must 
hold all of the facts of the older cases in the context. Another difficulty seems to be 
that rules such as this are meta-rules, rules about rules. They are certainly rules 
about the facts rather than merely relations which connect incidental facts.26 It is 
possible to incorporate rules like this into the production rule model, but the task 
will not be easy, and there is no guarantee that such an approach will yield the 
desired results. 
Induction 
This difficulty of formulating rules which capture case law reasoning may 
reflect the fact that case law reasoning is closer to inductive than to deductive 
reasoning. Although reasoning with case law may have some deductive components, 
the essence of it would appear to be to generalize from a number of instances rather 
than the application of logical rules.27 To capture some of the ideas of inductive 
26Alan Tyree (1989). Expert Systems in Law. Sydney: Prentice Hall, p. 133. 
27Ibid., p. 133-134. 
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reasoning, rules are constructed from a number of examples but this methods 
require a relatively large number of samples. Ideally, the method of reasoning with 
case law should take a small number of cases, selected by a domain expert, and be 
able to "reason" with those cases so as to solve similar legal problems. 
Alternative approach to precedent 
As it is often quoted that "like cases should be decided alike", an alternative 
approach to precedent may be the concept of "similarity". This form of inferencing 
can function efficiently and only requires a small sample of cases. Although the 
notion of ratio decidendi that precedent relies on is hard to define in abstract terms, 
there is wide agreement that the factual content of the case is important. So there 
may be some notion of similarity between pairs of cases which is based upon the 
factual content of the cases. Indeed, empirical studies showed that lawyers hold 
some common notion of similarity between cases.28 
To quantify the similarity between cases, each case is described in the 
knowledge base by a set of "facts". It is important to note that lawyers do not treat 
all facts to be of equal weight when attempting to decide similarity of cases. This 
problem can be solved by asking an expert lawyer to attach importance to various 
facts. 29 
The basic idea is to probe the user for the value of the propositions of a 
problem. Once those values are found, use vector arithmetic and Pythagorean 
Theorem to compute the "spatial distances" to each of the sample cases stored in the 
28Alan lyree (1989). Expert Systems in Law. Sydney: Prentice Hall, p. 138. 
29Ibid„ p. 139. 
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knowledge database. The case with the "closest" distance would be the best 
precedent for the problem under consideration.30 
Product/Service Liability in Hong Kong 
DeHnition 
After much introduction on expert systems, the following paragraphs will be 
devoted to the domain of knowledge that this project focuses on，namely 
product/service liability. Each year, billions of new products/services pour into 
various markets all over the world. The vast majority have been tested, retested, 
and tested again for quality and safety. In fact, quality control has never received 
more attention than in the 1980s. Yet, millions of injuries, some leading to death, 
occur from the use of those products/services each year. 
A survey of court reports involving Fortune 500 firms showed that the major 
plaintiff allegations in product liability suits included: (i) Defective construction or 
materials; (ii) Failure to comply with codes; (iii) Failure to investigate the sciences; 
(iv) Failure to properly warn the user of hazards; (v) Failure of the product to 
perform as advertised; and (vi) Improper design and Failure fault of two or more 
manufacturers.31 
According to a 1984 report, in US alone, the number of product liability 
suits filed in federal district courts has increased 500% in the previous eight years.32 
30Alan Tyree (1989). Expert Systems in Law. Sydney: Prentice Hall, p. 139-142. 
31Irwin Gray (1975Y. PRODUCT IIABIOTY A Management Response. New York: 
AMACOM, p.4. 
32Stephen Settle and Sharon Spigelmyer(1984). PRODUCT LIABILITY A Multibillion-
Dollar Dilemma. New York: American Management Associations, p.9. 
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Not only is the number of product liability suits skyrocketing, so is the insurance 
costs and the size of the verdicts. On February 4，1993，General Motors Corp. was 
held liable in an Atlanta court for the death of a teenager when his pickup truck 
erupted in flames after a drunk driver broadsided it. GM owed the family of the 
deceased teenager $4.24 million。The jury also awarded another $101 million in 
punitive damages.33 
Law 
Relying on the product liability law today, an injured party can sue either 
under tort or contract theories. The trend is toward strict liability, holding either a 
manufacturer or seller liable when a product that is "unreasonably dangerous" is 
placed on the market. But there is a wide discrepancy about what a defect is, what 
standards of proof will be allowed, who will be held liable, who has standing to 
sue, the amount (if any) of punitive damages, and whether "market share" theories 
will be allowed.34 
In addition to strict liability and negligence theories, a manufacturer can be 
held liable under warranty (contract) theories. There are two kinds of warranties-
express and implied. An express warranty is a specific representation about the 
characteristics of the product. In order for an injured party to have a cause of action 
under an express warranty theory, the purchaser had to have relied on the promise. 
A misrepresentation must be proved. An implied warranty is one which the court 
imputes to every product, e.g. a product is expected to have a "warranty of 
merchantability" and a "warranty of fitness11.35 
33 "NOW，THE COURT OF PUBLIC OPINION HAS GM WORRIED." International 
BusinessWeek. 3294-624 (February 22，1993):28. 
34Stephen Settle and Sharon Spigelmyer(1984). PRODUCT LIABILITY A Multibillion-
Dollar Dilemma. New York: American Management Associations, p. 10. 
35Ibid., p. 18. 
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This project will only focus on the situation where an action of product 
liability is brought forward under Tort law. The basic principles of tort law in Hong 
Kong are the same as those in English tort law. In some areas，the Hong Kong 
courts have developed guidelines of their own, for example in awards of damages 
for personal injury or fatal accidents, and in some areas, where tests of 
reasonableness are applied, what is perceived as reasonable in Hong Kong may well 
differ from what is reasonable in England. But otherwise, English law applies. 
In essence, Hong Kong tort law consists of the body of decisions of the 
English courts on matters of tort, with the addition of some decisions of the Hong 
Kong courts. The latter add-ons point out those issues where Hong Kong's cultural 
differences from England have led to variations in interpretation of the law. Hong 
Kong tort law does not differ greatly from the law of tort in Australia, New Zealand 
or Canada.36 
SigniHcance to Management 
One may ask what the big fuss over product liability. Indeed, corporate 
executives used to be unconcerned about product liability suits and resorted to legal 
and insurance defenses which turned out to be a serious profit hemorrhage. Those 
two defenses are just passive approaches against product liability suits. A more 
active approach is liability prevention. To stem the hemorrhage, top executives can 
formulate preventive policy at the top levels and carefully assign liability prevention 
to operating groups below.37 With profits and the reputation of the company on the 
36Robyn Martin (1987). LAW OF TORT IN HONG KONG. Hong Kong: China & Hong 
Kong Law Studies, p.l. 
37Irwin Gray (1975V. PRODUCT UABIOTY A Management Response. New York: 
AMACOM, p.l. 
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line, it is imperative for the top management to be closely involved in 





With Hong Kong's legal system in mind, the project is to create a prototype 
expert system which will assist lawyers in analyzing product/service liability cases-
a specific area of Tort Law—and make preliminary assessments on the liability of 
the defendant in a more consistent and flexible way. 
Research Objective 
To design and construct a prototype expert system that will prompt the user 
for facts about a specific product/service liability case and arrive at a conclusion 
concerning the liability of the defendant. 
Scope of the Project 
Due to the wide area Tort Law encompasses, this project will focus solely on 
Product/Service Liability cases in which the plaintiff(s) suffered from damages after 
"consuming" a product or service and brought an action against the defendant(s) 
under tort of negligence. 
On best effort to mimic a human legal expert, a production rule-based 
system will be used, i.e. using a set of rules suggested by human experts in the 
22 
field, the computer system will make a conclusion on whether the defendant is 
liable. 
User should note that the plaintiff could be a purchaser, a passenger, a 
borrower or a bystander; and the defendant could be the maker of the product, the 





To construct the knowledge base of this prototype expert system, specific 
knowledge and know-how of various experts in this domain needed to be acquired. 
Initial research was devoted to secondary data. 
Law books outlining the process of deducing negligence were studied in-
depth. Landmark cases for each step of the process were also noted and so were the 
judgments with rationales. Expert opinions from these sources were gathered and 
analyzed using an rule induction process. Induction is a process of reasoning from 
the specific to the general. In expert system terminology it refers to the process in 
which rules are generated from example cases.38 This is particularly useful for 
designing expert systems that operate in a complex domain where experts have 
varying opinions. 
Once a preliminary set of rules were formed, a solicitor, Ms Sarah Chung, 
who works in the area of Tort, was interviewed and asked to verify the reality and 
accuracy of these rules. Her professional insights has made the rules closer to how a 
lawyer access such kind of cases in real life. 
38EfraimTurbaii(1988). DECISION SUPPORT AND EXPERT SYSTEMS 
MANAGERIAL PERSPECTIVES. New York: Macmillan, p.386. 
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Brief Outline of the rules 
Cases are first screened out by several criteria，namely that the case was a 
product/service liability case; the action was brought forth within the limitation 
period; and the types of damages were actionable. 
Next step depends on whether "res ipsa loquitor" can be invoked. If this rule 
of "the thing speaks for itself" can be invoked for the benefits of the plaintiff, the 
defendant is presumed to be negligent and he needs to prove that reasonable care 
had been taken to avoid the kind of accident in question. Otherwise, the burden of 
proof rests on the plaintiff to prove that the defendant owed him a duty of care and 
had breached that duty, thus leading to negligence. 
Once negligence can be established, the plaintiff needs to prove causation, 
i.e. the damage suffered by the plaintiff was the result of the defendant's breach of 
duty. And then, the plaintiff is required to show that there was a legal connection 
between the act/omission and the damage, i.e. the damage was not remote. 
Lastly, the defendant can rebut by attributing contributory negligence and 
voluntary assumption of risks. 
For more detail, please refer to the Inference Tree in Appendix A. 
Knowledge Representation 
In deciding which knowledge representation method is appropriate, the 
important factor is to find the most accurate representation to model the given 
domain. In the case of this project, general rules—relationship between facts—are 
extracted from various cases. As a result, a rule-based representation scheme was 
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chosen for the prototype expert system in the project. In a rule-based expert system, 
the basic knowledge concerning the relationships of facts about the domain are 
stored in a series of IF-THEN rules. The rules form a hierarchical structure 
approaching the problem from the general to the specific in a symptomatic 
approach.39 
For the structure of the Inference Tree, please refer to the Inference Tree in 
Appendix A. 
Expert System Development Tools for the project 
In looking for the right development tool, two sharewares and the Turbo 
Prolog language have been carefully considered: 
XXXPERT 
XXXPERT，a free of charge shareware program, is an expert system 
development facility which includes an editor, file manager and expert system 
inference engine packaged together in one integrated environment. You can use 
XXXPERT to develop expert systems that use rules you write in an English 
language syntax. 
Given the ambiguity of the English language and the inflexibility of the 
XXXPERT shell program, it is not adequate for creating a structured legal expert 
system. 
39Carl Townsend (1986). MASTERING EXPERT SYSTEMS WITH TURBO PROLOG. 
1st ed. Indianapolis: Howard W. Sams & Company, p. 130. 
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Impshell 
IMP Shell, another shareware program, is a powerful expert system 
development environment for the IBM PC. It contains all the utilities needed to 
develop and test new expert systems, and run them when they are finalized. All 
functions are menu driven and appear in windows. IMP expert systems are rule 
based, backward chaining systems. They are very fast and not limited by an 
artificially small number of rules. This shell was written entirely in TURBO 
PROLOG. The IMP Shell uses backward reasoning. This means that it has the 
proper architecture for creating good expert systems for classification tasks, for 
troubleshooting, and, in general, for anything that involves choosing among 
alternatives. 
However, it is not the proper architecture for applications such as legal 
expert system that require a well defined sequence of steps with complex reasoning 
going into the application of each step. 
Turbo Prolog 
Prolog is a very important tool in artificial intelligence applications 
programming and in the development of expert systems. Several well-known expert 
system shells are written in Prolog, including APES, ESP/Advisor and Xi. A 
Prolog program gives the computer a description of the problem using a number of 
facts and rules, and then asks it to find all the possible solutions to the problem. 
Turbo Prolog is the first implementation of Prolog for the IBM PC and compatible 
personal computers that is both powerful and conservative in its memory 
requirements.40 
40TURBO PROLOG the natural language of artificial intelligence Owner's Handbook, p.3. 
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After careful consideration, I decided to use Turbo Prolog as the 
development tool for the legal expert system project for the following reasons:41 
a) Turbo Prolog is a declarative language. This means that, given the necessary 
facts and rules, it can use deductive reasoning to solve programming 
problems. 
b) Turbo Prolog is flexible and easy to use. It is a full-fledged compiler with a 
pull-down menu interface and full arithmetic, graphics and system-level 
facilities. 
c) Turbo Prolog is memory efficient. It produces compiled programs that 
execute very quickly but do not gobble memory. 
d) Turbo Prolog can be interfaced to other languages such as C and assembly to 
provide additional procedural support. 
41TURBO PROLOG the natural language of artificial intelligence Owner's Handbook, p.3-




1. A rule-based representation scheme was chosen for the prototype expert 
system in the project. To restrict the scope of the project, the rules are static, 
i.e. the rules in the domain remain fixed. 
2. "The expert system may only help lawyers in arriving at a very preliminary 
assessment of a case because there are many exceptions that will affect the 
final assessment", commented Ms Sarah Chung, practicing solicitor in the 
area of Tort. 
3. This expert system is only a prototype, an initial attempt to computerize a 
specific area of Tort. As a result, the "Why & How facilities", that any 
sophisticated expert systems should have, were not implemented. 
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CHAPTER V 
SYSTEM CONFIGURATION & ANALYSIS 
System Design 
Figure 3 
Structure Chart of Expert System 
Main 
Module 
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Main Module 
This module controls the flow of execution by calling on other sub-modules 
to perform necessary routines. 
Case Screening Module 
This module screens out cases that are not product/liability cases, or cases 
that were brought forward after the limitation period, or cases with ineligible types 
of damages. 
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Duty of Care Module 
This module tries to establish the duty of care the defendant owed to the 
plaintiff by proving that there was a sufficient proximity between the plaintiff and 
the defendant according to the Neighbor Principal. Policy considerations are also 
taken into account to see if scope of the duty is negated or reduced in any ways. 
Breach of Duty Module 
This module tries to prove that the defendant indeed breached the duty of 
care owed to the plaintiff. Two premises are being looked at: whether the risk of 
damage was foreseeable and whether the risk was an unreasonable risk to take. If 
both premises turn out to be true, the breach of duty can be established. 
Causation Module 
This module proves that the damage suffered by the plaintiff was the result 
of the defendant's breach of duty. One question will be asked of the plaintiff: If not 
for the defendant's action/inaction, would the plaintiff have suffered damage? "No" 
would imply causation. 
In addition, simultaneous causes and successive injuries need to be 
considered as well. Any intervening events in the process of injuries cannot break 
the chain of causation if causation is to be established. 
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Remoteness of Damage Module 
This module tries to prove that there is a legal connection between the 
act/omission and the damage by verifying that the kind of damage was foreseeable 
regardless of the extent of damage. 
Defendant's Defense Module 
This module provides the defendant a chance to rebut by attributing a share 
of blame to the plaintiff using "contributory negligence" and "voluntary assumption 
of risk". 
Reference Cases Module 
Facts and judgments of approximately 60 real-life cases relating to 
product/service liability were summarized and coded in TURBO PROLOG. When 
the expert system is executing and a reference case is referred to on the screen, user 
can press F2 to view a brief summary of the case. For detailed description of 
reference cases, please refer to Appendix B. 
Help Module 
When F1 is pressed, a brief summary of what the expert system is trying to 
prove at that stage will be displayed. 
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Minimum System Requirements 
-IBM PC or compatible computer 
-640Kbyte RAM internal memory 
-MS-DOS operating system, version 2.0 or later 
To run the executable file in the enclosed floppy diskette, go to b: drive， 
type "tort" and press the ENTER key. 
System Testing 
Every possible path of execution has been tested thoroughly to make sure 
that the program flow is carried out according to the logic laid out in the inference 
tree (Appendix A). User feedback on the ease of use and understanding is taken 





Since the expert system created in this project is just a prototype, there are 
still a lot of imperfections that can be further improved and enhanced. For one 
thing, the principles or rules stored in the program are static in nature, i.e. the rules 
will not expand by itself. However, due to the continuous development and 
expansion of tort law, it is recommended that these rules be updated accordingly 
when changes occur or be made into a more dynamic form. 
Another possible improvement lies in the primitive "Why & How facilities" 
currently used in this system. Every sophisticated expert system should have a 
complete justification sub-system because the reasoning process is as important as 
the outcome of the reasoning. 
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APPENDIX A : INFERENCE TREE 
lc Start proof 
---> Screen cases (p.35) 
and 
— > Prove negligence (p. 36) 
and 
---> Causation-damage suffered by plaintiff was the result of the breach of duty (p.43) 
and 
—> Damage not remote—a legal connection between the act/omission and the damage 
(p.45) 
and 
—> Defendant's defence not established (p.45) 
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2. Screen cases 
> remind user of what this system does and what types of cases it can deal with; ask 
user whether to continue or to abort. 
and 
> Proceed if the bringing of proceedings is within the Limitation Period. 
The Limitation Period is either :_ 
(1) Six years from the date on which the cause of action accrued, that is, the 
time when the damage was done; 
or 
(2) Three years after the plaintiff has the knowledge required for bringing an 
action in respect of the damage, that is, the time when the plaintiff has 
knowledge of the facts of the damage and the identity of the producer etc. 
Whichever period is later. (Section 31 of the Limitation Ordinance, Cap.347 of the 
laws of Hong Kong). 
and 
---> Only certain types of damage can give rise to an action in negligence: 
一 > personal injury such as damage to life and limb, loss of enjoyment of life, 
loss of expectation of life, pain and suffering. 
or 
——> nervous shock 
or 
…> damage to property such as machinery being wrecked in an explosion 
happened in a factory 
or 
---> pure economic loss which is truly consequent on personal or property injury 
suffered by the plaintiff, such as loss of earnings, loss of profit in the sale of 
damaged products. 
or 
---> special case of pure economic ioss which is not accompanied by any personal 
or property injury suffered by the plaintiff. In such a case, the plaintiff 
should have specially relied on the skill and expertise of the defendant. 
(Junior Books v Veitchi [1982] 3 All ER 201). 
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3. Prove negligence 
-’-> The defendant is presumed negligent 
> 'Res ipsa loquitur1 (meaning 'the thing speaks for itself，that is，the mere 
fact of an accident occurring raises an inference of the defendant's 
negligence. This is a presumption in favor of the plaintiff) applies when 
— > The thing is shown to be under the management of the defendant or 
his servants. 
and 
—，> The accident is such as in the ordinary course of things does not 
happen if those who have the management use proper care. 
(Scott V London & St. Katherine's Dock [1865] 3 H. & C. 596). 
and 
一一 > The defendant fails to rebut the presumption effected by 'res ipsa loquitur1 
> Actual cause of the accident is known, therefore the presumption 
does not apply. 
(Barkway v South Wales Transport Co. Ltd. [1950] 1 All E.R. 392) 
or 
---> The defendant has NOT taken reasonable care to avoid the accident. 
or 
> The plaintiff has to prove that the defendant1 s negligence 
-―> The defendant owed a duty of care to the plaintiff (p.37). 
and 
— > Breach of duty by the defendant (p.40) 
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3.1. Duty of Care 
Sufficient proximity between the plaintiff and the defendant according to the 
Neighbor Principal. Under Neighbor Principal (Donoghue v Stevenson [1932] 
A.C.562), the defendant must take reasonable care to avoid acts or omissions which 
he can reasonably foresee would be likely to injure his neighbors, the persons who 
are closely and directly effected by his act. (Examples on p.37) 
(Anns v London Merton Borough Council [1977] 2 All E.R.492) 
and 
> There are no considerations which ought to negate the scope of the duty of care. 
(Examples on p.39) 
(Anns v London Merton Borough Council [1977] 2 All E.R.492) 
3.1.1. Examples of sufficient proximity 
---> For personal injuries and damage to property suffered by the plaintiff as a result of 
the defendant's act, the foresight of damage will be sufficient to establish the 
necessary proximity . 
(Donoghue v Stevenson [1932] A.C.562, Home Office v Dorset Yacht Co. [1970] 
AC . 1004) 
or 
> If plaintiff was a rescuer to a person suffering personal injuries or property damage 
as a result of the defendant's act, 
(Haynes v Harwood [1935] 1 K.B. 147，Videan v British Transport Commission 
[1963] 2 All E.R. 860) 
or 
> In the case of Nervous Shock, because 'shock' in its nature is capable of affecting 
so wide a range of people, a real need for the law to place some limitation upon the 
extent of admissible claims. It is necessary to consider :-
•?r- > The class of persons whose claim should be recognized. The closer the tie of 
the persons, the greater the claim for consideration, for example, husband 
and wife, parent and child. 
and 
---> The proximity of such persons to the accident. This must be close in both 
time and space. 
and 
> The means by which the shock was caused. The shock must come through 
sight or hearing of the event or of its immediate aftermath. 
(McLoughlin v O'Brian [1982] 2 W.L.R. 982) 
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or 
— > In the case of negligently made statements, since the harmful effects of a statement 
can carry much further than the effects of an act, stringent limitations have been 
placed on the notice of proximity. There must be special relationship between the 
plaintiff and the defendant. (Hedley Byrne and Co. Ltd. v Heller and Partners Ltd。 
[1964] A.C。465) For examples:-
— > Contractual relationship 
or 
> Relationships of fiduciary duty 
or 
> Where there was an express undertaking or warranty 
or 
> The statement was being relied upon and that the informer knew that it was. 
or 
"一 > Particular relationship created, e.g. the defendant held himself out as 
competent to give the information or advice and the circumstances must have 
caused the defendant to realize or ought to have realized that he was being 
trusted by the plaintiff and the plaintiff intended to act upon the information 
or advice. 
(Mutual Life & Citizen's Assurance Co. v Evatt [1971] A.C. 793) 
or 
---> A general relationship equivalent to contract exists, e.g. solicitor and client; 
banker and customer. 
or 
> In the case of Pure Economic Loss which was truly consequent on personal injury 
or property damage, duty of care will exist when damage was foreseeable. 
(Spartan Steel v Alloys Ltd. v Martin & Co. (Contractors) Ltd. [1973] Q.B. 27) 
or 
— > In special case of Pure Economic Loss, in order to limit the area in which economic 
damage may be recovered. A strict test of proximity should be used, which 
effectively narrows the class of plaintiffs eligible to recover financial loss. A 
defendant will owe a duty of care and therefore be liable for economic damage due 
to his negligent conduct when he could reasonably foresee that a specific individual, 
as distinct from a general class of persons，would suffer financial loss as a 
consequence of his conduct. 
(Caltex Oil Ltd. v The Dredge Willemstad [1976] 11 A.L.R. 227, Ross v Caunters 
[1980] Ch 297) 
or 
---> In special case of Pure Economic Loss, where there was an exceptionally close 
proximity between the plaintiff and the defendant in that the plaintiff relied upon the 
skills and expertise of the defendant. 
(Junior Books Ltd. v Veitchi Co. Ltd. [1983] 1 A.C. 520) 
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or 
— > Product/Service was dangerous. 
product/service had to be dangerous and might result in injury to the 
consumer's (plaintiff's) life or property, 
(Donoghue v Stevenson [1932] A.C。562) 
3.1.2. Policy Issues 
— > the possibility of a floodgate claims will limit number of possible claims. 
(Home Office v Dorset Yacht Co Ltd. [1970] A.C. 1004) 
or 
---> the defendants may be liable for enormous amounts which are disproportionate to 
the fault caused. 
(Hill v Chief Constable of West Yorkshire [1989] A.C. 53) 
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3.2. Breach of Duty 
— > Risk of Damage was Foreseeable (p.40) 
and 
— > NOT (Reasonable Risk to take) (p。42) 
3.2.1. Risk of Damage is Foreseeable 
— > To prove that defendant has breached the duty of care owed to the plaintiff, the 
foreseeability of the risk of damage needs to be established. To judge the 
foreseeability of the risk of damage, one needs to take the position of a reasonable 
man. 
— > Consider the Standard of Foresight of the reasonable man who is free from 
over-apprehension or over-confidence, and independent of the idiosyncrasies 
(peculiarities) of the defendant whose conduct is called in question 
3.2.1.1. Standard of Foresight 
> (Rule 1) The degree of care varies directly with the risks involved; the higher the 
degree of probability that damage will be done, the higher the degree of care 
required. (Bolton v Stone [1951] 1 All E.R. 11078) 
and 
---> (Rule 2) It is the knowledge of the reasonable man not the knowledge of the 
tortfeasor which must determine foreseeability. 
and 
二 > (Rule 3) If the tortfeasor~defendant~has greater knowledge than the reasonable 
person, the tortfeasor must meet the standard of the reasonable person with that 
extra knowledge. 
(Stokes v Guest, Keen & Nettlefold (Bolts and Nuts) Ltd. [1968] 1 W.L.R. 1776) 
and 
---> (Rule 4) It is the knowledge of the reasonable person at the time of the act which is 
relevant, not the knowledge at time of trial. 
(Roe v Minister of Health [1954] 2 All E.R. 131). 
and 
> (Rule 5) It is the skill of the reasonable person and not the skill of the tortfeasor— 
defendant—which must determine foreseeability. Where a person hold her or himself 
out to have skills above that of the reasonable person, the standard will be that of 
the skilled person. 
(Wimpey Construction v Poole [1984] 2 Lloyd's Rep 499，Bolam v Friern Hospital 
[1957] 2 All E.R. 118) 
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and 
—> (Rule 6) Even the higher standard of the professional is not an absolute standard. 
The reasonable professional will still make mistakes. 
(Whitehouse v Jordan [1981] 1 W.L.R. 246) 
and 
(Rule 7) An indicator of what a reasonable person in a trade or profession might do 
is the common practice in that trade or profession. Common practice however is not 
conclusive as to reasonableness. 
(Edward Wong Finance Co Ltd. v Johnson Stokes & Master [1984] 2 W.L.R. 1， 
Luxmore-May v Messenger may & Baverstock [1990] 1 All E.R. 1067 at 1075-
1076) 
and 
—-> (Rule 8) Where there are varying practices within a trade or profession, a member 
of the profession need only follow a practice accepted as proper by a responsible 
body of the members of the profession. 
(Bolam v Friern Hospital [1957] 2 All E.R. 118) 
and 
> (Rule 9) A learner training for a skill, trade or profession must meet the same 
standard as a skilled person. 
(Nettleship v Weston [1971] 2 Q.B. 691, Wilsher v Essex Area Health Authority 
[1987] Q.B. 730) 
and 
---> (Rule 10) Amateurs are held to a half way standard, higher than that of the 
reasonable untrained person, yet lower than the standard of the professional. 
(Wells v Cooper [1958] 2 Q.B. 265) 
and 
> (Rule 11) A child is expected to meet the standard of the reasonable person at that 
age. When a defendant ceases to be a child is unclear. 
(McHale v Watson [1965-66] 38 ALJR 266) 
and 
—> (Rule 12) If a handicapped person has taken on a task which requires particular 
expertise, then that person is holding him or herself out to have the required skills, 
and should be held to that standard. 
(Insurance Commissioner v Joyce [1948] 77 C.L.R. 39) 
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3.2.2. Reasonable Risk to take 
If the risk of damage was foreseeable, one has to look at whether a reasonable person in the 
circumstances would have taken the risk. 
> the activity giving rise to the risk was lawful, 
and 
---> the greater the magnitude of the harm, the greater the precautions that will be 
required. 
(Paris v Stepney Borough Council [1951] A.C. 367) 
and 
— > it was difficult to eliminate the risk even when the defendant had taken adequate 
precautions against the risk. 
(Haley v London Electricity Board [1965] A C. 778, Latimer v A.E.C. [1953] 
A.C. 643) 
and 
---> there was some usefulness of the defendant's conduct and possible justification for 
the risk to be taken into account. 
(Watt v Hertfordshire County Council [1954] 1 W.L.R. 835) 
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4. Causation 
--> "But For" Test: If not for the Defendant's action/inaction, would the Plaintiff have 
suffered damage? "No" would imply causation. 
(Barnett v Chelsea Hospital |1969] 1 All E.R. 1068，Robinson v Post Office [1974] 
1 W.L.R. 1176) 
and 
— > If exist simultaneous causes: common sense will dictate whether one or all of the 
possible reasonable persons will be held liable. 
(Fitzgerald v Lane and Patel [1987] 2 All E.R. 455) 
and 
---> If exist successive Injuries: Policy will indicate a solution. Issue is whether the 
original tortfeasor should continue to be liable for the injury subsumed by the 
greater damage resulting from the second event. 
(Baker v Willoughby [1969] All E.R. 1528) 
and 
---> If a new intervening event exists ("novus actus interveniens"), there must be NO 
break in chain of causation (p.43) 
4.1* Break in chain of causation 
> Natural event, 
---> If defendant's breach of duty had neither increased the likelihood that the 
plaintiff would suffer damage from an intervening natural event nor rendered 
him more susceptible to the damage, break in chain of causation is 
established when the natural event happened. 
(Carslogie Steamship Co. Ltd. v Royal Norwegian Government [1952] A.C. 
292) ‘ ‘ 
or 
— > Innocent act by plaintiff 
---> Break in chain of causation if the innocent intervening act of the plaintiff 
was an unreasonable response to the defendant's negligent act. 
or 
—- > Negligent act by plaintiff 
---> Break in chain of causation if the negligence of the defendant was followed 
by a negligent act of the plaintiff causing extra damage. 
(McKew v Holland & Hannen & Cubitts (Scotland) Ltd. [1969] 3 All E.R. 
1621, 1623) 
or 
---> Negligent act by a third party 
— > Break in chain of causation if the negligent act of a third party was 
unwarrantable and unreasonable, creating a new cause to disturb the 
sequence of events. 
(Lord v Pacific Steam-The Oropesa [1943] 1 All E.R. 211 at 214) 
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or 
---> Deliberate act by a third party 
l“- > courts have been most reluctant to find defendant liable for the deliberate 
acts of third parties, even where the third parties' acts could have been 
considered foreseeable. 
(Perl (Exporters) v Camden London Borough [1984] Q.B. 342, Lamb v 
Camden L.B.C. [1981] Q.B. 625, 637-638) 
or 
---> Break in chain of causation if intervening act was foreseeable. 
™ > a reasonable person can foresee the intervening act as one of a class of 
foreseeable acts likely to arise from the original negligence. 
(Knightley v Johns [1982] 1 W.L.R. 349, 365，A-G v Madam Ho hing-mui 
[Hong Kong, 1982] Civ App No 61 of 1982) 
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5. Damage Not Remote 
— > Foreseeability test 
-r- > damage was not remote if the kind of damage was foreseeable; it did not 
matter that it was more extensive than could have been foreseen—thin skull 
rule. 
(Wagon Mound (No 1) [1961] A.C. 388, Smith v Leech Brain & Co. Ltd. 
,[1962] 2 Q.B. 405，Vacwell Engineering Co. Ltd. v B.D.H. Chemicals Ltd. 
[1971] 1 Q。R 88) 
6. Defendant's Defense 
(Burden of proof of establishing such a defense is on the defendant) 
> Contributory negligence (p.45) 
or 
-‘-> "Volenti non fit injuria" —voluntary assumption of risk (p.47) 
6.1. Contributory Negligence 
> the standard to be applied to the plaintiff in determining the plaintiff's contributory 
negligence is that of the reasonable person in all the circumstances of the case. 
(Sayers v Harlow UDC [1958] 2 All E.R.342) 
and 
> If the plaintiff had particular knowledge and skill, the standard to be applied is that 
of the person with that knowledge or skill. 
(Wheeler v Copas [1981] 3 All E.R. 405) 
and 
---> the negligence of the plaintiff contributed to the injury or damage. 
(Caswell v Powell Duffryn Associated Collieries [1939] A.C. 152，175，Pasternack 
v Poulton [1973] 2 All E.R. 74) 
and 
— > NOT that (the defendant put the plaintiff in a dilemma such that the plaintiff acted 
reasonably but injured him or herself attempting to avoid greater injury.) 
and 
— > The plaintiff was not a rescuer, because the court is unlikely to find that a rescuer 
was contributorily negligent in going to a rescue and exposing him or herself to 
danger. 
(Caswell v Powell Duffryn Associated Collieries [1939] A.C. 152，175) 
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and 
> If plaintiff was a child. The child may only be guilty of contributory negligence 
where the child is of an age where it is reasonable to expect him or her to take 
precautions for his or her own safety. However, Hong Kong courts appear to have 
expected a greater degree of responsibility on the part of children. 
(Liu Tat-chor v Liu Fook-tim [Hong Kong, 1974] Civ App No 46，Cheung Yuk-
chun v Mitsui Construction [1985] 15 HKLJ 112，Lam Yuen-wan v Tai kam-tong 
[Hong Kong, 1979] H。CA. No 5443) 
and 
— > Plaintiff failed to take reasonable care of his own safety. 
(Jones v Iivox Quarries [1952] 1 T.L.R 1377) 
and 
-—> Plaintiff reasonably foresaw the harm to himself. 
(Froom v Butcher [1974] 3 All E.R. 520) 
and 
> Court will NOT apportion damages. 
Last Opportunity rule (Lloyds Bank Ltd. v Budd [1982] R.T.R. 80). 
---> if the defendant had the last opportunity to avoid the accident, the 
rule enabled the plaintiff to recover. 
or 
---> if defendant could have avoided the accident but plaintiff could not, 
plaintiff could recover damage. 
or 
— > Law Amendment and Reform (Consolidation) Ordinance (LARCO) cap 23of 
the laws of Hong Kong. 
> the court has the power to apportion damages as it thinks fit, taking 
into account the degree of contributory negligence. 
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6.2. Volenti non fit injuria (Voluntary assumption of risk) 
Since the statutory reform to contributory negjigence, the courts will only find volenti in 
extreme cases, probably where there is some moral blame worthiness on the part of the 
plaintiff. 
---> The plaintiff was not a rescuer. The court is reluctant to find that a rescuer or a 
workman acts voluntarily 
(Haynes V Harwood [1935] 1 K.B. 147) 
and 
> true if plaintiff consented to the risk. (p.47) 
6.2.1. Plaintiff consented to the risk 
™ > plaintiff did NOT just have mere knowledge of the danger. Mere knowledge of the 
danger does not necessarily imply consent。 
(Smith v Baker & Sons [1891] A.C.325) 
and 
—-> Plaintiff accepted the risk. (p.47) 
6.2.1.1. Plaintiff accepted 
t > There was an agreement between the plaintiff and defendant, 
and 
---> The agreement was not obtained by fraud, duress, or moral duty, there had been no 
acceptance of the risk. 
(Haynes v Harwood [1935] 1 K.B. 147) 
and 
—> If the agreement contained an exclusion or limitation clause which was reasonable. 
(Buckpitt v Gates [1968] 1 All E.R. 1145) 
and 
> The plaintiff had a choice as to whether to take the risk. 
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APPENDIX B: CASES REFERENCED IN THE EXPERT SYSTEM 
1. A-G v Madam Ho hing-mui [Hong Kong, 1982] Civ App No 61 of 1982 
Facts: During a sterilization operation, the D doctor negligently left a surgical swab in P's 
uterus which later developed into a tumor. A second doctor was called upon and 
perform an unneccesary hysterectomy to remove the swab and tumor. 
Held: Hysterectomy was common given the situation. The second doctor was not liable but the 
original doctor was held liable for the subsequent damage. 
2. Anns y London Merton Borough Council [1977] 2 All E.R. 492 
Facts: The foundations of the building that Ps were leasing were negligently laid and cracks 
appeared. Ps sued the local authority for not inspecting the foundations to comply with 
by-laws. 
Held: The Council was under a duty to give proper consideration to the question whether it 
should exercise its power to inspect the foundations, and if the Council did choose to 
inspect, it was under a duty to do so with reasonable care and skill. 
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3. Barkway v South Wales Transport Co. Ltd. 1 AU E.R. 392 
Facts: As a passenger in D's ominibus, P was killed in accident due to a defect in one of the 
tyres which could have been reported by D's drivers. 
Held: The House of Lords held that as the cause of the accident was known, res ipsa loquitur 
did not apply, but that on the facts the negligence of the Ds was established. 
4. Baker y WiUoughby [1969] All E.RC 1528 
Facts: P was injured in a car accident in 1964 due to the negligence of D, and suffered injuries 
to his leg which resulted in a permanently stiff ankle. In 1967 he was working in a scrap 
yard when he was shot by a robber and his leg was amputated. 
Held: P was entitled to damages for the stiff leg for ever and not just for the period 1964-
1967，because after 1967 the causes of his lost capacity were concurrent. Thus the 
robber, if sued, would only have had to pay for the loss of an already damaged leg. 
5. Barnett y Chelsea Hospital [1969] 1 All E.R. 1068 
Facts: P's husband fell ill after drinking some tea, and went to the D hospital. The doctor was 
himself unwell and told the man to go home and call his own doctor. The P's husband 
was in fact suffering from arsenic poisoning, and died. 
Held: The hospital clearly owed a duty to the patient, and that duty had been breached. 
However, The P was not able to show that but for the doctor's negligence, her husband 
would not have died. The action failed. 
6. Bolam y Friern Hospital [1957] 2 All E.R. 118 
Facts: The P was treated with electro-convulsive therapy for a mental illness. As a result of the 
treatment he suffered bone fractures, and he claimed that doctors were negligent in not 
giving relaxant drugs before treatment. 
Held: The usual standard by which a tortfeasor was to be judged was that of the person in the 
street. But where the situation involved some special skill or competence, then the test 
would be that of the ordinary person exercising or professing to have that special skill. 
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7. Bolton y Stone [1951] 1 All E.R. 11078 
Facts: P was struck by a cricket ball hit out of a cricket ground. The ground was surrounded 
by a fence whose top was^ 17 feet above the level of the pitch. The fence was 78 yards 
from the striker, and P when hit, was 100 yards away. 
Held: The club was not negligent. Breach of duty would depend on whether the risk of damage 
to a person on the road was so small that a reasonable man in the position of D would 
have thought it right to refrain from taking steps to prevent the danger. 
8. Buckpitt y Oates [1968] 1 All E.R. 1145 
Facts: Volenti defense had been pleaded against P in D's car in which there was a notice 
stating that passengers traveled at their own risk. 
Held: Section 149 of the Road Traffic Act 1988 will today exclude the defense in this 
situation. 
9. Caltex Oil Ltd. y The Dredge WiUemstad [1976] 11 A.L.R. 227 
Facts: Australian Oil Refining Ltd. (AOR) owned a pipeline across Botany Bay which led 
from the Caltex Oil terminal to the AOR refinery. The oil in the pipeline belonged to 
Caltex, but the risk of loss was, by contract, on AOR. On 26 October 1971 the dredge 
WiUemstad negligently broke the pipeline. Caltex claimed the extra expense caused by 
having to transport oil round the bay while the pipeline was being repaired. 
Held: allowing the appeal, that the defendants were liable even though the plaintiffs had 
suffered only economic loss. 
10. Carslogie Steamship Co. Ltd. y Royal Norwegian Government [1952] A.C. 292 
Facts: P's ship collided with D's ship at D's fault. After temporary repairs, P went to the US, 
an unnecessary voyage if not for the collision. In the Atlantic, she suffered extensive 
damage due to storm, and in the US, damages from the collision and the storm were both 
fixed. 
Held: The damage by the storm was not a consequence of the collision, and must be treated as 
a supervening event occurring in the course of a normal voyage. No reasonable man 
would say the storm damage was within the foreseeable risk created by the D's 
negligence. 
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11. Caswell y Powell Duffryn Associated Collieries [1939] A.C. 152，175 
Facts: A workman was killed in a mining accident. The workman had been careless. 
Held: If the P were negligent, but his negligence was not a cause operating to produce the 
damage，there would be no defense. It is impossible to divorce any theory of contributory 
negligence from the concept of causation。 
12. Cheung Yuk-chun y Mitsui Construction [1985] 15 HKLJ 112 
Facts: information unavailable 
Held: A 9-year old girl was held to be 15 % responsible for a traffic accident. 
13. Donoghue y Stevenson [1932] A.C. 562 
Facts: The P's friend bought for the P a bottle of ginger beer which was later found to contain 
a decomposed snail. The bottle was made of opaque glass. The P became ill from 
drinking the ginger beer, and brought an action for compensation against the 
manufacturer. 
Held: A manufacturer does owe a duty to the consumer to be careful in the manufacture of 
goods. 
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14. Edward Wong Finance Co Ltd. y Johnson Stokes & Master [1984】2 W.L.R, 1 
Facts: The D solicitors carried out a mortgage transaction in the 'Hong Kong style completion' 
and forwarded the purchase money to the vendor's solicitor The vendor's solicitor fled 
Hong Kong with the money. 
Held: The Privy Council questioned: whether the conveyance involved a foreseeable risk, 
whether the risk was avoidable, and whether the solicitors were negligent in failing to 
avoid it. Despite strong evidence that the D followed the common practice, D was found 
to be negligent. 
15. Fitzgerald y Lane and Patel [1987] 2 All E.R. 455 
Facts: A pedestrian was struck by one car and thrown to the other side of the road where he 
was struck by another car. He suffered severe injuries. The second driver claimed that the 
P was unable to prove that the impact with the second car worsened the P's injuries. 
Held: dismissing the appeal, that the P should receive 50% of his damages. 
16. Froom y Butcher [1974] 3 All E.R. 520 
Facts: The P was injured while driving in the D's car, due to the D's negligence. The P had 
chosen not to wear a seat belt because he felt that in some circumstances the seat belt 
increased the risk of injury. 
Held: allowing the appeal, that the P was contributorily negligent. In Hong Kong, the wearing 
of a seat belt in the front seat of the care is made compulsory by the Road Traffic 
(Protective Equipment) Regulations 1983，Regulation 5A. 
17. Haley v London Electricity Board [1965] A.C, 778 
Facts: The P, who was blind, fell into a trench in the pavement which had been dug by the Ds. 
A five foot long hammer had been placed in front of the trench，which would have been 
sufficient to warn a normally sighted person of the danger. 
Held: Evidence showed that there were a significant enough number of blind persons for it to 
be reasonably foreseeable that a blind person might pass along the pavement on any day. 
D was held liable. 
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18. Haynes v Harwood [1935] 1 K.B. 147 
Facts: The D's servant left a van and horses unattended in a crowded street. The horses bolted. 
A police constable saw a woman and child in danger, and at great risk to himself tried to 
stop the horses. He was injured and sought damages from the D. 
Held: Although the P knew of the risk, he was under a moral duty to take the risk, and could 
not be held to have accepted it. D was held liable. 
19. Hedley Byrne and Co. Ltd. y Heller and Partners Ltd. [1964] A.C. 465 
Facts: The Ps were advertising agents who wanted to know the creditworthiness of a company 
which had proposed a large advertising contract. The plaintiffs asked their bank to make 
inquiries, and this bank asked the defendant, a firm of merchant bankers who dealt with 
the company, for its advice. The defendant bank informed the Ps，without responsibility, 
that the company was creditworthy, but were negligent in giving this information. The Ps 
went ahead with the advertising contract and lost money. 
Held: dismissing the appeal, that there could be a duty not to make a statement carelessly 
which causes only economic loss, but that in the circumstances the disclaimer prevented a 
duty arising and the defendants were not liable。 
20. Hill y Chief Constable of West Yorkshire [1989] A.C. 53 
Facts: The mother of the last victim of a mass murderer (the 'Yorkshire Ripper') sued the 
police for negligently failing to apprehend the murderer sooner. 
Held: The House of Lords held that there was not sufficient proximity between the parties. D 
was not held liable. 
21. Home Office v Dorset Yacht Co Ltd. [1970] A.C. 1004 
Facts: A group of Borstal boys were stationed on an island under the supervision of officers 
who knew their records and who were instructed to keep the boys in their care and 
control. Seven of the boys escaped, and in the process damaged the P's yacht. The P sued 
the Home Office as vicariously liable for the negligence of the warders. 
Held: dismissing the appeal, that the Home Office was liable. It was found that the Home 
Office did owe the yacht owners a duty of care. 
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22. Insurance Commissioner y Joyce [1948] 77 C.L.R, 39 
Facts: The P was injured in a traffic accident when he traveled in a car driven by the D. Both 
the P and D were drunk. 
Held: If a passenger knowingly accepts the voluntary services of a driver affected by alcohol, 
he cannot complain of improper driving caused by his condition, because it involved no 
breach of duty. 
23. Jones y Livox Quarries [1952] 1 T.L.R 1377 
Facts: P worked in a quarry and was riding on the back of a traxcavator. The traxcavator, 
which had a speed of two mph, rounded an obstruction and stopped to change gear, when 
it was run into from behind by a dumper truck and the P was injured. 
Held: dismissing the appeal, that the P was contributorily negligent. A person is guilty of 
contributory negligence, if he did not act as a reasonable, prudent man, he might be hurt 
himself, and in his reckoning he must take into account the possibility of others being 
careless. 
24. Junior Books Ltd. y Veitchi Co. Ltd. [1983] 1 A.C. 520 
Facts: The D flooring contractors were laying floors in a building being constructed for P. The 
floors were negligently laid and so, the flooring was uneven and cracked, but the floors 
posed no danger to the health or safety of any person in the building. P claimed damages 
for the cost of relaying the floor and the economic loss consequent on having the floor re-
laid. 
Held: Duty of care was found because of the close relationship of proximity such that the P 
was reliant on the particular skill and expertise of the D. 
25. Knightley y Johns [1982] 1 W.L.R. 349, 365 
Facts: D negligently overturned his car in a one way tunnel. The police inspector co-ordinating 
the rescue forgot to close the tunnel to further traffic, and sent the P police motor cyclist 
back through the tunnel against the traffic to close the tunnel. P was hit by a car which 
was not driven negligently, and sought damages from D for his injuries. 
Held: The inspector's negligence became a new cause, and broke the chain of causation. D 
was not held liable. 
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26. Lam Yuen-wan y Tai kam-tong [Hong Kong, 1979] H.C.A. No 5443 
Facts: information unavailable 
Held: The High Court refused to find contributory negligence on the part of the four year old 
P who stepped out onto the road in the path of vehicle. 
27. Lamb y Camden L.B.C. [1981] Q.B. 625，637-638 
Facts: The water main outside P's house was breached by workmen of the D council. Water 
flooded the foundations and the house began to subside. While the house was waiting to 
be repaired squatters broke in and did considerable damage to the house. The P's claim 
against the Ds included a claim for the damage done by the squatters. 
Held: Policy, such as allocation of responsibility for keeping squatters out, denied a claim 
here. The principle is that a test of foreseeability and policy is to be used. 
28. Latimer v A.E.C. [1953] A.C. 643 
Facts: The Ds1 factory floor became slippery after rain. The Ds arranged for three tons of 
sawdust to be spread on the floor, but nevertheless the P slipped and was injured. 
Held: allowing the appeal, that the Ds were not liable as they had acted as a reasonable 
employer would have acted. 
29. Liu Tat-chor y Liu Fook-tim [Hong Kong, 1974] Civ App No 46 
Facts: information unavailable 
Held: A 12 year old boy was held to be two thirds responsible for a traffic accident. 
30. Lloyds Bank Ltd. y Budd [1982] R.T.R. 80 
Facts: information unavailable 
Held: Lord Denning MR re-iterated his opinion about the 'last opportunity1 rule, saying that it 
had 'gone forever'. 
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31. Lord v Pacific Steam-The Oropesa [1943] 1 All E.R. 211 at 214 
Facts: Owing to the negligence of the masters of the ship the Oropesa, The Oropesa and 
another ship, the Manchester Regiment，collided. Tlie captain of the Manchester 
Regiment set out in a lifeboat with some of the crew，including P's son，intending to 
reach The Oropesa and send for help. The lifeboat overturned and the P's son was 
drowned. The P claimed that Oropesa's original negligence was the cause of the son's 
death. 
Held: The captain did not act unreasonably. So the chain of causation was not broken. D held 
liable. 
32. Luxmore-May y Messenger may & Baverstock [1990] 1 All E.R. 1067 at 1075-1076 
Facts: information unavailable . 
Held: information unavailable 
33. McHale y Watson [1965-66] 38 ALJR 266 
Facts: A boy aged 12 aimed a sharpened steel rod at a post, but the rod bounced off and hit the p 
Held: dismissing the appeal, that the D was not liable. In this case, the standard of the 
reasonable twelve year old was applied. 
34. McKew y Holland & Hannen & Cubitts (Scotland) Ltd. [1969] 3 All E.R. 1621, 
1623 
Facts: The P was injured in an accident due to the D's negligence with the result that his leg 
gave way occasionally. The P was descending a staircase without a handrail, 
unaccompanied, when he fell and was injured. He sought compensation for the second 
injury from the D. 
Held: The P knew that his leg had a tendency to give way, yet chose to place himself in a 
position where he had no support. His unreasonableness in doing so broke the chain of 
causation and the D was not found liable for the second injury. 
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35. McLoughlin y O'Brian [1982] 2 W.L.R. 982 
Facts: P's husband and three children were injured in a car accident caused by the negligence 
of D. P went to the hospital and saw her husband and her son before they had been 
attended to. She saw one child after she had been cleaned up, and was informed of the 
death of the other. Allegedly, she suffered severe shock, organic depression and a change 
of personality. 
Held: The P in this case，who was closely related to the victims and who came across the 
immediate aftermath of the accident，was able to recover damages. 
36. Mutual Life & Citizen's Assurance Co. v Evatt [1971] A.C, 793 
Facts: P approached MLC Assurance Ltd for advice as to the safety of investments in a 
company called H G Palmer Ltd.，both companies belong to the same parent. On the 
basis of the advice he received, P not only kept his investments in H G Palmer but also 
invested more money, which he eventually lost. 
Held: allowing the appeal, that the Ds owed no duty to the P. The D company was neither in 
the business of supplying information or advice nor that it claimed to possess reliable 
advice. 
37. Nettleship y Weston [1971] 2 Q.B. 691 
Facts: The P, Eric Nettleship, was teaching a friend of his, Lavinia Weston, to drive. She 
negligently hit a lamp post and the P suffered a broken knee cap. 
Held: allowing the appeal, that the D was liable. The Civil law requires of a learner the same 
standard of care as of any other driver. The case also raised the issue whether the P 
consented to the risk of injury, and it was held that he did not. 
38. Paris y Stepney Borough Council [1951] A.C. 367 
Facts: The P was a one-eyed garage hand who was struck in his only eye by a splinter from a 
bolt. He was not wearing goggles, 
Held: A reasonable and prudent employer would be influenced not only by the greater or 
lesser probability of an accident occurring to the worker in question, but also by the 
gravity of the consequences to the worker if it did occur. D was held liable. 
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39. Pasternack y Poulton [1973] 2 All E.R. 74 
Facts: The P was at a party and was offered a ride hoe in the D's car. There were seat belts in 
the car but the P was not aware of them, nor did the D wear a seat belt. The P was 
injured in an accident and sued the D。 
Held: The P's failure to wear a seat belt did not contribute to the accident, but it was held to 
be sufficient for contributory negligence that the failure contributed towards the damage 
suffered by the P. Damages were reduced by 5%. 
40. Perl (Exporters) y Camden London Borough [1984] Q.B. 342 
Facts: P owned a flat which had a common wall with a flat owned by the D council. The 
council flat was left vacant and unlocked so that it was often inhabited by vagrants. 
Thieves broke through the neighboring wall from the council flat and stole the P's 
property. P sued the Ds for their negligence in allowing the property to remain unlocked. 
Held: There was no relationship of control between the D and the perpetrator of the 
intervening act. The question of duty of care was doubtful. D was not held liable. 
41. Robinson v Post Office [1974] 1 W.L.R. 1176 
Facts: The P slipped on an oily ladder and cut his shin. He went to a doctor who gave him an 
anti-tetanus injection. The P was allergic to the serum and contracted encephalitis. 
Held: dismissing the appeal, that the Ds were liable for the entire damage. 
42. Roe y Minister of Health [1954] 2 All E.R.131 
Facts: Ps were paralyzed after minor operations owing to the leakage of disinfectant into the 
spinal anesthetic through tiny invisible cracks in the ampoules. Medical knowledge at the 
time of the operation could not have foreseen the paralysis, but papers pointing out the 
dangers were published shortly afterwards. By the time of the trial, the dangers were well 
know. 
Held: The Ds must be judged according to the knowledge of a reasonable doctor at the time of 
the act, not according to knowledge later acquired. Ds were not liable. 
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43. Ross y Caunters 丨1980® Ch 297 
Facts: The D solicitors prepared a will for a client, failing to tell the client that the will should 
not be witnessed by the beneficiary's husband. The testator died, and when the 
beneficiary could not take under the will, she claimed damages from the solicitors. 
Held: D held liable. Although the 'special relationship1 laid down in Hedley Byrne could not 
be satisfied, the existence of this proximate relationship justified applying the test for 
duty of care laid down in Anns。 
44. Sayers y Harlow UDC [1958] 2 All E.R.342 
Facts: The P became locked in a public lavatory. She called for help but none came, so she 
tried to climb out over the door, and in doing so put her foot on the toilet roll attachment. 
The toilet roll holder revolved causing her to slip and fall. She sought damages from the 
council. 
Held: It was found that the attempt to escape was reasonable, but that the means of attempted 
escape involved some carelessness, and the damages were reduced by one quarter to 
account for this. 
45. Scott y London & St. Katherine's Dock [1865] 3 H&C 596 
Facts: information unavailable 
Held: There must be reasonable evidence of negligence. But where the thing is shown to be 
under the management of the D or his servants, and the accident is such as in the ordinary 
course of things does not happen if those who have the management use proper care，it 
affords reasonable evidence, in the absence of explanation by the Ds，that the accident 
arose from want of care. 
46. Smith y Baker & Sons [1891] A.C.325 
Facts: The P employee was employed to drill holes in rock, and as he worked, cranes lifted 
rubble overhead. P was aware of the danger because he had been working there for some 
time, but continued with the job, and on one occasion was hit by a falling rock. 
Held: Mere knowledge of the risk does not necessarily involve consent to the risk. On the 
facts, the worker was concentrating on the drilling at the time of the accident and did not 
know the crane was overhead. D was held liable. 
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47. Smith y Leech Brain & Co，Ltd. [1962] 2 Q.B. 405 
Facts: P's husband was a galvanizer in the D's iron works. While P was operating a crane, a 
piece of molten metal splashed out of a tank and burned his lip. P's susceptibility to 
cancer turned the burn into cancer causing the P's husband's death. 
Held: The Wagon Mound foreseeability test was not whether D could reasonably have 
foreseen that the burn would cause cancer, but only whether the D could have foreseen 
that as a result of his negligence the worker would suffer a burn. 
48. Spartan Steel y Alloys Ltd. y Martin & Co. (Contractors) Ltd. [1973] Q.B. 27 
Facts: P's electricity supply was cut off as a result of the D's negligence. When the power was 
cut, there was a danger that molten metal in the P's furnace might solidify, so oxygen 
was pumped into the metal, reducing its value. P claimed for physical damage to the 
metal, loss of profit in the sale of the metal and loss of production until the power 
resumed. 
Held: allowing the appeal, that P could only recover for the physical damage to the melt in 
progress, plus loss of profit on that melt, but not for the profits they would have made 
wMe the power was off because the failure of an electricity supply was a community 
burden. 
49. Stokes y Guest，Keen & Nettlefold (Bolts and Nuts) Ltd. [1968] 1 W.L.R. 1776 
Facts: P, a toolsetter died of cancer contracted through long term contact with oil. A 
reasonable employer in the D's trade would not have known of the cancer risk, and 
common practice in the trade took no safety precautions. D, however, employed a doctor 
who was responsible for the general safety organization of the hospital, and who had 
special knowledge of occupation medicine and industrial hygiene. The doctor should have 
know from medical literature on the subject, of the risk of cancer. 
Held: The presumed knowledge of the doctor could be imputed to the employers, and they 
were to be judged as reasonable employers with knowledge of the cancer risk. Such an 
employer would have taken steps to avoid risk, and the employer was negligent for not 
doing so. 
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50. Vacwell Engineering Co. Ltd. y B.D.H. Chemicals Ltd. [1971】1 Q.B. 88 
Facts: The Ps were manufacturers who were using in their manufacturing process a chemical 
prepared by the Ds. The chemical was known to be harmful, and the ampoules containing 
the chemical bore the words 'harmful vapor', but the reaction of the chemical to water 
was unknown. One of the Ps1 physicists was washing the labels from ampoules of the 
chemical when a violent explosion occurred, causing damage to the Ps' premises. The Ps 
sought damages from the Ds. 
Held: An explosion of a minor kind was foreseeable but that explosion of this magnitude was 
not foreseeable. But the extent of the damage need not be foreseeable. D was held liable. 
51. Videan y British Transport Commission [1963] 2 All E.R, 860 
Facts: Taking a family trip, P's husband~the stationmaster of a small railway station-realized 
that his son was missing. Seeing that his son was sitting on a railway line and a 
motorized trolley driven by one Soilness was approaching. P's husband threw himself 
in front of the trolley to save his son and was killed. The son was saved, but injured. 
Held: allowing her appeal, that a duty was owed to her husband. It was foreseeable by Souness 
that as the stationmaster might well have some proper occasion for going on the track 
in the performance of his duties. 
52. Wagon Mound (No 1) [1961] A.C. 388 
Facts: The Ps were owners of wharf and were carrying out repairs on a ship, using oxy-
acetylene torches. The D's ship the Wagon Mound, meanwhile, was leaking furnace oil 
into Sydney Harbor. When the manager of the Ps' operations saw the oil he prohibited 
further welding until he had made inquires about safety. He was advised that welding 
could continue because furnace oil was extremely difficult to ignite on water. The oil did 
however catch fire, destroying the wharf. 
Held: allowing the appeal, that the Ds were not liable. The Ps in this case could not argue that 
the Ds should reasonably have foreseen fire as a type of damage, because they had taken 
expert advice to the effect that furnace oil was not ignitable on water when deciding 
whether or not to continue with their welding operations. 
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53. Watt v Hertfordshire County Council [1954] 1 W.L.R. 835 
Facts: The D fire service went to the rescue of a woman trapped under a heavy vehicle. The 
rescue required use of a heavy jack, but there was no available truck equipped to carry it. 
The jack was loaded on to another truck, and the P fireman was injured when the jack 
rolled. 
Held: dismissing the appeal, that the Ds were not negligent in sending out the jack unsecured. 
The Court of Appeal felt that the saving of life and limb justified a considerable risk 
being taken. 
54. Wells y Cooper [1958] 2 Q,B. 265 
Facts: The D, a home carpenter, repaired a door handle in his house, but used screws 
insufficient for the purpose. The P visitor fell back and was injured when the handle 
came off，and sought damages from the D. 
Held: allowing the appeal, that the D was not liable. The degree of care and skill required of a 
householder undertaking his own repairs was to be measured not by reference to his own 
degree of personal competence, but by reference to the degree of care which a reasonably 
skilled amateur carpenter would take. 
55. Wheeler y Copas [1981] 3 All E.R. 405 
Facts: The P bricklayer was working on the D's farm. He needed to borrow a ladder from the 
farmer for his work, and chose one of the farmer's ladders. When the P used the ladder 
for carrying heavy equipment the ladder gave way and the P was injured. The P sued the 
farmer. 
Held: The P was a professional bricklayer who knew the purpose for which the ladder was to 
be used and knew the type of ladder required. A reasonable person with that knowledge 
would not have chosen to use the farmer's ladder. Damages were reduced by 50% to take 
into account the P's contributory negligence. 
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56. Whitehouse y Jordan [1981] 1 W.L.R. 246 
Facts: A baby, delivered by caesarian after an attempted forceps delivery, suffered brain 
damage during the forceps attempt. It was found at first instance that the doctor had fallen 
below the very high standard of professional competence the law requires. 
Held: The standard does allow for some errors of judgment. Professional persons could not be 
held liable for every eventuality. On the facts，the doctor's actions constituted an error of 
judgment which might be made by any person of similar skills, acting with reasonable 
care. 
57. Wilsher y Essex Area Health Authority [1987] Q.B. 730 
Facts: The P was a child who had been born three months prematurely. His survival was in 
doubt for nearly three months，during which time he was given extra oxygen. As a result 
of an excess of oxygen he was rendered blind. The baby had been treated in the special 
care unit by a recently qualified house doctor. 
Held: The inexperienced doctor called upon to exercise a specialist skill could seek the advice 
and help of his superiors，and if that were done would be absolved of negligence. On the 
facts, the doctor had not reached the standard of the specialist, and the hospital was 
vicariously liable for the doctor's negligence. 
58. Wimpey Construction y Poole [1984] 2 Lloyd's Rep 499 
Facts: A professional engineer held himself out as having especially high skills, and was hired 
on that basis. The court was asked to determine whether a structure had been negligently 
designed. 
Held: The standard of care was that of the ordinary skilled person exercising and professing to 
have professional skill, not that of a person professing to have especially high 
professional skills. The standard of the ordinary reasonably engineer was applied. 
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APPENDIX C: PROGRAM LISTING 
Tort, pro 
/* A Prototype Expert System on Product/Service Liability */ 



















write negligence title 
defendant_presumed_negligent 










/ * “ - „ _ — 一 一 - * / 
/* Main Decision Tree */ 




makewindow(2,7,2,"A Prototype Expert System on Product/Service Liability",0,0,24,80), 
create_status_line, 
prove liability， 
write("\n\nDefendant is LIABLE in Tort of Negligence!")， 
pause continue。 
start_proof:fe 















write("\n\nDefendant is NEGUGENT!\n\n"), 
pause continue. 
prove negligence:-
write("\n\nDefendant is NOT negligent!\n\n"), 
pausecontinue, 
fail.— 
/* — */ 
/* Negligence */ 






write("Since the defendant succeeded in rebutting 'res ipsa loquitor',\n"), 
write("the plaintiff has to prove the defendant's negligence by proving:\n\n"), 
write—(1) The defendant owed a DUTY OF CARE to the plaintiff.\n\n"), 
write("AND\n\n")， 
write("(2) BREACH OF DUTY by the defendant.")， 
pause一continue， 
dutyofcare,!, 
breach of duty。 
defendant_presumed negligent:-
writenegligencetitle, 
write("The defendant is presumed negligent if 'res ipsa loquitur' is applied.\n\n"), 
write('"Res ipsa loquitur' (meaning the thing speaks for itself, that is, the\n"), 
write("mere fact of an accident occurring raises an inference of the defendant's\n"), 
write("negligence. This is a presumption in favor of the plaintiff.\n\n")? 
res_ipsa loquitur，S， 
dfai l torebut. 
resipsaloquitur:-
write("Determine whether ’res ipsa loquitur1 can be applied:\n\n"), 





write(lf\n\nls it true that the accident is such as in the ordinary course\n"), 
write("of things does not happen if those who have the management use proper\n"), 








write("Since 'res ipsa loquitur雪 is applied, the defendant must rebut the\n"), 
write( "presumption. \n\n"), 
write("Is it true that the actual cause of the accident is known?\n"), 
write("(Barkway v South Wales Transport Co. Ltd. [1950] 1 All E.R. 392)\n\nM), 
write("(t/f)")， 
read true false(TorF)， 
pop case, 
TorF= ,t',!. 
d一fail一to rebut: _ 
write("\n\nls it true that the defendant has NOT taken reasonable care\n"), 
write("to avoid the accident?\n"), 
write("(t/f)")， 
read_true_false(TorF 1)，！， 




Turbo Prolog Toolbox 
(C) Copyright 1987 Borland International. 
In order to use the tools, the following domain declarations 
should be included in the start of your program 
**************************************************************** J 
DOMAINS 
ROW, COL, LEN, ATTR = INTEGER 
STRINGUST = STRING* 
INTEGERLIST = INTEGER* 
KEY = cr; esc; break; tab; btab; del; bdel; ctrlbdel; ins; 
end ； home ； fkey(INTEGER) ； up ； down ； left ； right ； 
ctrlleft; ctrlright; ctrlend; ctrlhome; pgup; pgdn; 




Turbo Prolog Toolbox 
(C) Copyright 1987 Borland International。 
Status Line 
Uses window number 83 for a status line. 
«1« «1« «1« •!« ^L* sL* st* >1* / 不甲不不不甲甲不不甲不甲不甲甲币甲甲甲甲甲甲甲甲甲甲甲甲甲甲甲甲不甲甲甲币币甲甲？ J S币币币币甲币币币甲甲甲甲甲甲甲币巾巾巾巾巾巾平巾巾巾巾个个个, 
PREDICATES 
makestatus(ATTR,STRING) 



























Turbo Prolog Toolbox 
(C) Copyright 1987 Borland International. 
This module includes some routines which are used in nearly 
all menu and screen tools. 
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j****************************************************************j 









/* miscellaneous */ 
/ 山 山 山 山 山 山 山 tJ^ 山山山山 ^Lm 山 山 vL« vLf 山 ^ 士 企 士 J^f / 
•不不5J5不不不5J5甲甲甲甲甲甲甲币甲甲币币币币币甲币甲甲甲币币甲平甲币甲币币币不巾个巾巾巾平个巾个巾巾巾巾巾巾巾个巾个个个个个个中个, 
PREDICATES 
maxlen(STRINGUST,COL,COL) /* The length of the longest string */ 
listlen(STRINGUST,ROW) /* The length of a list */ 
writelist(ROW,COL,STRINGLIST) /* used in the menu predicates */ 
reverseattr(ATTR, ATTR) /* Returns the reversed attribute */ 
min(ROW,ROW,ROW) min(COL，COL，COL) min(LEN，LEN，LEN) min(INTEGER,INTEGER,INTEGER) 





L ^ G T H > M A X , ! , 
maxlen(T,LENGTH,MAX1). 
























/* Find letter selection in a list of strings */ 
/* Look initially for first uppercase letter。 */ 
/* Then tiy with first letter of each string. */ 









CHAR>= ,a ' ,CHAR<='z ' , ! , 
char_int(CHAR,CI), CIl = CI-32，char int(CH，CIl)。 
upc(CH,CH). 
lowc(CHAR,CH):-
CHAR>= 'A ' ,CHAR<= , Z ' 5 ! , 












N3 = Nl + 1, 
tryfirstupper(CHAR,T,N3,N2). 
tiyfirstletter(CHAR,[W| J ,N ,N) 
frontchar(W，CHXk，J，!. 
tryfirstletter(CHAR,[_|T],N1,N2) 







/* adjustwindow takes a windowstart and a windowsize and adjusts */ 
/* the windowstart so the window can be placed on the screen. */ 
/* adjframe looks at the frameattribute: if it is different from */ 
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/* zero, two is added to the size of the window */ 








I J < 25-DU,! ,ALI=LI,AKOL= 8 O - D K O L 。 
adjustwindow(_,KOL,DU,DKOL,AII,AKOL):-






/* Readkey */ 
/* Returns a symbolic key from the KEY domain */ 








readkey l(cr,_, 13):-!. 
readkey 1 (esc，一，27):-!. 
readkey 1 (break3): - ！ • 
readkey 1 (tab,,9): -!. 
readkey 1 (bdel, 8): -!. 
readkeyl(ctrlbdel,_, 127):-!. 
readkey 1 (char(T) ,T,_). 
readkey2(btab, 15):-! • 
readkey2(del,83):-!. 
















readkey2(fkey(N),VAL):- VAL>58, VAL<70, N=VAL-58, ！. 









/* Support subroutines */ 
invalid true false(char) 
invalid_yes_no(char) 
advanceoneline 
advance two lines 
position title 
positiontext 
create status line 
clauses 
/*___ */ 
/* Supporting Subroutines */ 




invalid true false(T or—F):-
notfTorF:'。， 
not(T~or~F=,f'). 











makestatus(l 12, "Fl-Help F2-Reference Cases"). 
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Func.pro 
/* Function Keys Module */ 
/•DATABASE 








display help detail(symbol) 
pushcase(symbol) 





display cases beneath 
display case detail(symbol) 


























































display all cases(N) :_ 
~ matchcase(CASENAME), 
CASENAME=unknown, 
N = l , “ . “ 
display_case_detail(CASEN AME). 























Replyval > LOWER, 
Reply~val< UPPER,!, 
















































/* Reference Case Screens */ 
display一case一 detail( "unknown"):-
write(n\n\nCase Information Unavailable\n\n"), 
read一any_key. 
display_case_detail(“ag madam"):-
write("A-G v Madam Ho hing-mui [Hong Kong, 1982]\n"), 
write(" Civ App No 61 of 1982\n\n"), 
write("Facts: During a sterilization operation, the D doctor negligently\n"), 
write(" left a swab in P's uterus which later turned into a tumor.\n"), 
write(" A second doctor later performed an unneccesaiy hysterectomy\n"), 
write(" to remove the swab and tumor.\n\n"), 
write("Held: Hysterectomy was common given the situation. The original\n"), 
write(" doctor was held liable for the subsequent damage.\n"), 
read any key. 
display一case_detail(" anns—london"):-
writeC'Anns v London Merton Borough Council [1977] 2 All E.R. 492\n\n"), 
write("Facts: The foundations of the building that Ps were leasing were\n"), 
write(" negligently laid and cracks appeared. Ps sued D for not\n")， 
write(" inspecting the foundations to comply with by-laws.\n\n"), 
write("Held: The Council was under a duty to consider whether\n"), 
write(" it should inspect the foundations. \n")， 
read any key. 
display一case—detail("barkway—south"):-
write("Barkway v South Wales Transport Co. Ltd。1 All E.R。392\n\n"), 
write("Facts: As a passenger in D's ominibus, P was killed in accident due\n"), 
write(" to a defect in one of the tyres which could have been\n"), 
write(“ reported by D's drivers.\n\n")， 
write("Held: The House of Lords held that as the cause of the accident\n"), 
write(" was known, res ipsa loquitur did not apply, but that on the\n"), 
write(" facts the negligence of the Ds was established.\n"), 
read一any key. 
display一case_detail(11 baker一willoughby "):-
write("Baker~v Willoughby [1969] All E.R. 1528\n\n")， 
write("Facts: P was injured in a car accident due to the D's negligence\n"), 
write(" and suffered from a stiff ankle since. Later on he was shot\n"), 
write(" by a robber and his leg needed to be amputated.\n\n"), 
write("Held: P was entitled to damages for the stiff leg for ever. Thus the\n"), 
write(" robber, if sued, would only have had to pay for the loss \n"), 
write(" of an already damaged leg.\n"), 
readanykey. 
display case:detail("barnett chelsea"):-
writeC'Barnett v Chelsea Hospital [1969] 1 All E.R. 1068\n\n"), 
write("Facts: P's husband fell ill and went to the D hospital. The doctor\n"), 
write(" was unwell and told the man to go to his own doctor. P's\n"), 
write(" husband was suffering fromarsenic poisoning, and died.\n\n"), 
write("Held: The hospital owed a duty to the patient, and that duty\n"), 
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write(" had been breached. However, P was unable to show but for\n"), 
write(" the doctor's negligence, her husband would not have died,\n")， 
read一any一key. 
display一case detail(11 bolam friern"):-
write("Bolamv Friern Hospital [1957] 2 All E.R. 118\n\n"), 
write("Facts: P was treated with electro-convulsive therapy for a mental\n"), 
write('，illness. As a result, he suffered bone fractures, and he\n"), 
write(" claimed that doctors were negligent in not giving relaxant drugs.\n\n"), 
write("Held: Where the situation involved some special skill or\n"), 
write(" competence, then the test would be that of the ordinary\n"), 
write(" person exercising or professing to have that skill.\n"), 
readanykey. 
display case一detail(“bolton一stone"):-
write("Bolton v Stone [195F] 1 All E.R. 11078\n\n")， 
write("Facts: P was struck by a cricket ball hit out of a cricket ground. \n"), 
write(" The ground was surrounded by a 17 feet tall fence。When P\n"), 
write(" was hit, P was 100 yards away from striker. \n\n"), 
write("Held: The club was not negligent. Breach of duty would depend on\n"), 
write(" whether the risk of damage was so small that a reasonable\n"), 
write(" man would refrain from taking steps to prevent the danger. \n"), 
readanykey. 
display一case detail("buckpitt oates"):-
writeC'Buckpitt v Oates [1968] 1 All E.R. 1145\n\n"), 
write("Facts: Volenti defense had been pleaded against P in D's car in\n"), 
write(" which there was a notice stating that passengers traveled\n"), 
write(" at their own risk.\n\n"), 
write("Held: Section 149 of the Road Traffic Act 1988 will today exclude\n"), 
write(" the defense in this situation.\n")， 
readanykey. 
display 一 c a s e _ d e t a i l ( " caltex一 dredge "):-
write("CaltexOil Ltd. v The Dredge Willemstad [1976] 11 A.L.R. 227\n\n"), 
write("Facts: D negligently broke a pipeline. D claimed the extra expense\n"), 
write(" caused by having to transport oil round through another route\n"), 
write(" while the pipeline was being repaired.\n\n11), 
write("Held: allowing the appeal, that the defendants were liable even\n"), 
write(" though the plaintiffs had suffered only economic loss.\n"), 
readanykey. 
display_case_detail(“carslogie royal"):-
write("Carslogie Steamship Co. Ltd. v Royal NorwegianVn"), 
write— Government [1952] A.C. 292\n\n")， 
write("Facts: P's ship collided with D's ship at D's fault. After temporary\n"), 
write(" repairs, P went to the US and was further damaged in a storm.\n"), 
write(" In the US, all damages were fixed.\n\n"), 
write("Held: The damage by the storm was not a consequence of the\n"), 
write(" collision. No reasonable man would say the storm damage\n"), 
write(" was within the foreseeable risk created by the D's negligence.Xn")， 
read_any_key^ 
display_case_detail(" caswell_powell "):-
write("Caswell v Powell Duffryn Associated \n")， 
write(" Collieries [1939] A.C。152，175\n\n"), 
write("Facts: A workman was killed in a mining accident。The workmanXn"), 
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write(" had been careless.\n\n"), 
write("Held: If the P were negligent, but his negligence was not a cause\n"), 
write(" operating to produce the damage，there would be no defense.\n"), 
write(" It is impossible to divorce any theory of contributory\n"), 
write(" negligence from the concept of causation. \n"), 
read一any key. 
display 一 c a s e — d e t a i l ( 1 1 cheungmitsui "):-
writeC'Cheung Yuk-chun v Mitsui Construction [1985] 15 HKU 112\n\n"), 
write("Facts: information unavailable\n\n"), 




writeC'Donoghue v Stevenson「1932] A.C. 562\n\n"), 
write("Facts: P's friend bought P an opaque bottle of ginger beer which\n"), 
write(" contained a decomposed snail in it. P became ill from\n"), 
write(" drinking the ginger beer，and sued the manufacturer. \n\n"), 
write("Held: A manufacturer does owe a duty to the consumer to be\n"), 
write(" careful in the manufacture of goods.Nn"), 
readanykey. 
displaycasedetail (" edwardJ ohnson "):-
write(11 Edward Wong Finance Co Ltd. v Johnson Stokes & \n")， 
write(v Master [1984] 2 W丄.R. l\n\n"), 
write("Facts: In the usual 'Hong Kong style completion雷，the D solicitors\n"), 
write(" forwarded the purchase money to the vendor's solicitor. \n"), 
write(" The vendor's solicitor fled Hong Kong with the money.\n\n"), 
write("Held: Despite strong evidence that the D followed the\n"), 
write(" common practice, D was found to be negligent.\n")， 
readanykey. 
display 一 c a s e — d e t a i l ( “ fitzgerald_lane "):-
writeC'Fitzgerald v Lane and Patel [1987] 2 All E.R. 455\n\n"), 
write("Facts: A pedestrian was struck by one car and thrown to the other\n"), 
write(" struck by another car. He suffered severe injuries. The\n")? 
write(" second driver claimed that the P was unable to prove that the\n"), 
write(" impact with the second car worsened the P's injuries.\n\n"), 
write("Held: dismissing the appeal, that the P should receive 50% of his\n"), 
write(" damages. \n"), 
readanykey. 
display case detail(“froom butcher"):-
write("Froom v Butcher [1974] 3 All E.R. 520\n\n"), 
write("Facts: P was injured while driving in D's car, due to D'sXn"), 
write(" negligence. P had chosen not to wear a seat belt because he\n"), 
write(" felt thatthe seat belt increased the risk of injury.\n\n"), 
write("Held: allowing the appeal, that the P was contributorily negligent.\n"), 
readanykey. 
display一case detail( "haley london"): _ 
write("Saley~V London Electricity Board [1965] A.C. 778\n\n"), 
write("Facts: P, blind, fell into a trench in the pavement dug by Ds. A five\n"), 
write(" foot long hammer was placed in front of the trench which\n"), 
write(" would have been sufficient to warn normally sighted people.Xn"), 
write("Held: There were a significant enough number of blind persons for\n"), 
write(" to be reasonably foreseeable that a blind person might pass\n"), 
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write(" along the pavement on any day. D was held liableAn"), 
read一any一key. 
display一case_detail( "haynes—harwood "):-
write("Haynes v Harwood [1935] 1 K.B. 147\n\n"), 
write("Facts: The horses D's van bolted in a crowded street. A police\n"), 
write(" constable was injured when, at great risk, tried to save a\n"), 
write(" ) woman and child.\n\n"), 
write("Held: Although the P knew of the risk，he was under a moral duty\n"), 
write(" to take the risk, and could not be held to have accepted it. D\n"), 
write(" was held liableAn"), 
read一any key. 
display case detail("hedley heller"):-
write("Hedl^ Byrne and Co. Ltd. v Heller and Partners Ltd. [1964]\n"), 
write(" A.C. 465\n\n")， 
write("Facts: Ps, advertising agents, wanted to know the creditworthiness\n"), 
write(" of a client. They asked their bank which asked D who dealt\n"), 
write(" with the client. D negligently affirmed Ps and disclaimed any\n"), 
write(" responsibility. Ps lost money in the advertising contract.\n\n"), 
write("Held: the disclaimer prevented a duty arising and the defendants\n"), 
write(" were not liableAn"), 
read any key • 
display一case—detail( "hill 一chief"):-
write("Hill v—Chief Constable of West Yorkshire [1989] A.C. 53\n\n"), 
write("Facts: The mother of the last victim of a mass murderer ")， 
write(" (the 'Yorkshire Ripper1) sued the police \nfor negligentlyNn")， 
write(" failing to apprehend the murderer sooner.\n\n"), 
writeC'Held: The House of Lords held that there was not sufficient\n"), 
write(" proximity between the parties. D was not held liable.\n"), 
readanykey. 
display_case_detail(" homedorset"):-
write("Home"office v Dorset Yacht Co Ltd. [1970] A.C. 1004\n\n"), 
write("Facts: A group of Borstal boys under the supervision of warders,\n"), 
write(" escaped, and in the process damaged P's yacht. P sued \n"), 
write(" the Home Office as vicariously liable for thewardens.\n\n"), 
write("Held: dismissing the appeal, that the Home Office was liable. It\n"), 
write(" was found that the Home Office did owe the yacht owners a\n")， 
write(" duty of care.\n"), 
readanykey. 
display 一case一detail( “ insurance」oyce "):-
write("Insurance Commissioner v Joyce [1948] 77 C.L.R. 39\n\n"), 
write("Facts: The P was injured in a traffic accident when he traveled in\n"), 
write(" a car driven by the D. Both the P and D were drunk.\n\n"), 
write("Held: If a passenger knowingly accepts the voluntary services of a\n"), 
write(" driver affected by alcohol, he cannot complain of improper\n"), 
write(" driving caused by his condition, because it involved no\n")， 
write(" breach of duty.\n"), 
read_any_key, 
display_case_detail( "j oneslivox “):-
write(nJones~v Livox Quarries [1952] 1 T.L.R 1377\n\n"), 
write("Facts: P worked in a quarry and was riding on the back of a\n"), 
write(" traxcavator. When P stopped around a corner to change gear,\n"), 
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write(" P was injured by a dumper truck that ran into the batk of\n"), 
write(" the tranxcavator. \n\n"), 
write("Held: dismissing the appeal, that the P was contributorily\n"), 
write(" negligent. \n"), 
read_any_key. 
display_case_detail("juiiior_veitchi "):-
write("Junior Books Ltd. v一Veitchi Co. Ltd. [1983] 1 A.C. 520\n\n")， 
write("Facts: D were laying floors in a building for P« The floors were\n"), 
write(" negligently laid and cracked, but posed no danger, P claimed\n"), 
write(" damages for cost of relaying the floor and economic loss.\n\n"), 
write("Held: Duty of care was found because of the close relationship\n"), 
write(" of proximity such that the P was reliant on the particular\n"), 
write(" skill and expertise of the D.\n"), 
readanykey. 
display case detail("knightleyjohns"):-
write("Knightley v Johns [1982] 1 W.L.R. 349，365\n\n"), 
write("Facts: D negligently overturned his car in a one way tunnel. The\n"), 
write(" police inspector co-ordinating the rescue forgot to close\n")， 
write(" the tunnel and sent the P police motor back through the\n"), 
write(" tunnel against the traffic to close the tunnel and was hit.\n\n"), 
write("Held: The inspector's negligence became a new cause, and brokeW1)， 
write(" the chain of causation, D was not held liable.\n"), 
readanykey. 
display一case detail(" lam tai"): _ 
write(,fLam Yuen-wan v Tai kam-tong [Hong Kong, 1979]\n"), 
write(M H.C.A. No 5443\n\n"), 
write("Facts: information unavailable\n\n"), 
write("Held: The High Court refused to find contributory negligence on\n"), 
write(" the part of the four year old P who stepped out onto the road\n"), 
write(" in the path of vehicle.\n"), 
readanykey. 
display一case detail( “ lamb_camden"):-
writeC'Lamb'v Camden L^B.C. [1981] Q.B. 625, 637-638\n\n"), 
write("Facts: Water main outside P's house was breached by workmen\n"), 
write(" of the D council. Water flooded the foundations. While \n"), 
write(" waiting for repair ,squatters came and damaged the house\n\n"), 
write("Held: Policy, such as allocation of responsibility for keeping\n"), 
write(" squatters out, denied a claim here. The principle is that a\n"), 
write(" test of foreseeability and policy is to be used.\n"), 
readanykey. 
display—case一detail( “ latimer一aec "):-
write("Latimer v A.E.C. [1953] A.C. 643\n\n"), 
write("Facts: The Ds，factory floor became slippery after rain. The Ds"), 
write(" • arranged for three tons of \nsawdust to be spread on the floor,\n"), 
write(" but nevertheless the P slipped and was inj ured. \n\n “)， 
write("Held: allowing the appeal, that the Ds were not liable as they had\n"), 
write(" acted as a reasonable employer would have acted.\n11), 
read_any_key彳 
display一case一detail("liu_liu"):-
write(MLiu Tat-chor v Liu Fook-tim [Hong Kong, 1974] Civ App No 46\n\n"), 
write("Facts: information unavailable\n\n"), 
write("Held: A 12 year old boy was held to be two thirds responsible for\n"), 
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write(" a traffic accident.\n"), 
read一any_key, 
display case_detail( “ lloyds—budd"):-
writeC'Lloyds Bank Ltd. vBudd [1982] R.T.R. 80\n\n")， 
write("Facts: information unavailable\n\n"), 
write("Held: Lord Denning MR re-iterated his opinion about the\n"), 
write(" 'last opportunity' rule, saying that it had 'gone forever1.\n"), 
read一any key. 
display case detail("lord_pacific"):-
write("Lordv Pacific Steam-The Oropesa [1943] 1 All E.R. 211 at 214\n\n"), 
write("Facts: Due to negligence, the Oropesa collided with Manchester\n"), 
write(" Regiment (MC). The captain of MC set out in a lifeboat with\n"), 
write(" P's son in it. The lifeboat overturned and P's son was drowned.\n"), 
write("Held: The captain did not act unreasonably. So the chain of\n"), 
write(" causation was not broken。D held liable \n")， 
read any key. 
display 一case一detail(" luxmore一 messenger "):-
write( “ Luxmore-May v Messenger may & Baverstock [1990]\n"), 
write(" 1 All E.R. 1067 at 1075-1076\n\n"), 
write("Facts: information unavailable\n\n"), 
write("Held: information unavailable\n"), 
readanykey. 
display_case_detail(" mchalewatson"):-
write("McHale v Watson [1965-66] 38 ALJR 266\n\n"), 
write("Facts: A boy aged 12 aimed a sharpened steel rod at a post,\n"), 
write(" but the rod bounced off and hit the P.\n\n"), 
write("Held: dismissing the appeal, that the D was not liable。In this\n")， 
write(" case, the standard of the reasonable twelve year old\n"), 
write(" was applied. \n"), 
readanykey. 
display_case_detail(11 mckewholland "):-
write("McKew v Holland &llannen & Cubitts (Scotland) Ltd. [1969]\n"), 
write(" 3 All E.R. 1621，1623\n\n"), 
write("Facts: P was injured in an accident due to the D's negligence.\n"), 
write(" Since then, his leg gave way occasionally. P was descending\n"), 
write(" a staircase alone without a handrail, fell and was injured.\n\n"), 
write("Held: P knew of his weak leg, yet chose to place himself in a\n"), 
write(" position where he had no support. His unreasonableness\n"), 
write(" broke the chain of causation and the D was not found liable.Nn")， 
readanykey. 
display_case_detail( “ mcloughlin—obrian "):-
write("McLoughlin v O'Brian [1982] 2 W丄.R. 982\n\n"), 
write("Facts: P's husband and three children were injured in a car\n"), 
write(" accident due to D's negligence. P went to the hospital\n"), 
write(" saw her untreated family and learned of her child's death.\n\n"), 
write("Held: The P in this case, who was closely related to the victims \n"), 
write(" and who came across theimmediate aftermath of the\n"), 
write(" accident, was able to recover damages.\n"), 
read_any_key. 
display一case一detail (•• mutual 一evatt "):-
write("Mutual Life & Citizen's Assurance Co. v Evatt [1971] A.C. 793\n\n"), 
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write("Facts: P approached MLC for advice on investments in another\n"), 
write(" company that belong to the same parent。Using the advice，\n")， 
write(" P lost his investment.\n\n")„ 
write("Held: allowing the appeal, that the Ds owed no duty to the P. D\n"), 
write(" was neither in the business of supplying information or\n"), 
write(" advice nor that it claimed to possess reliable advice.\n"), 
read一any key, 
display—case一detail("nettleship weston"):-
write("Nettleship v Weston [1971] 2 Q.B. 691\n\n"), 
write("Facts: P was teaching D to drive. D negligently hit a lamp post\n"), 
write( “ and P suffered a broken knee cap • \n\n")， 
write("Held: allowing the appeal，that the D was liable. The Civil law\n"), 
write(" requires of a learner the same standard of care as of any\n"), 
write(" other driver. The case also raised the issue whether the P\n"), 
write(" consented to the risk of injury, and it was held that he did not.\n"), 
read一any key. 
display一case一detail(“paris stepney"):-
write("Parisv Stepney Borough Council [1951] A.C. 367\n\n"), 
write("Facts: P was a one-eyed garage hand who was struck in his only\n"), 
write(" eye by a splinter from a bolt. He was not wearing goggles:\n\n")， 
write(flHeld: A reasonable and prudent employer would be influenced by\n"), 
write(" gravity of the consequences to the worker if it did occur.\n")， 
write(" D washeld liable.\n"), 
read一any 一key. 
display 一case_detail( “ pasternack_poulton "):-
writeCTastemack v Poulton [1973] 2 All E.R. 74\n\n"), 
write("Facts: P was at a party and was offered a ride hoe in the D's \n"), 
write(" car. Unaware of the seat belts, P was injured in an accident\n"), 
write(" and sued the D.\n\n"), 
write("Held: P's failure to wear a seat belt was held to be sufficient for\n"), 
write(" contributing towards the damage. Damages were reduced\n")， 
write(" by 5%.\n")? 
readanykey. 
display一case—detail( “ perl—camden "):-
writeC'Perl (Exporters) v—Camden London Borough [1984] Q.B. 342\n\n"), 
write("Facts: P owned a flat sharing a common wall with a flat owned\n"), 
write(" by the D council. The council flat was left vacant and\n"), 
write(" unlocked. Thieves broke through the common wall and\n"), 
write(" and stole the P's property.\n"), 
write("Held: There was no relationship of control between the D and the\n"), 
write(" perpetrator of the intervening act.\n")， 
readanykey. 
display—case一detail(" robinsonjpost"):-
writeC'Robinson v Post Office [1974] 1 W.L.R. U76\n\n"), 
write("Facts: The P slipped on an oily ladder and cut his shin. He went to\n"), 
write(" a doctor who gave him an anti-tetanus injection. The P was\n"), 
write(" allergic to the serum and contracted encephalitis.\n\n"), 




write(MRoe v—Minister of Health [1954] 2 All E.R. 13 l\n\n"), 
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write("Facts: Ps were paralyzed after minor operations owing to the\n"), 
write(" leakage of disinfectant. Medical knowledge at the time\n"), 
write(" of the operation could not have foreseen the paralysis,\n"), 
write(" but papers pointing out the dangers were published laterAn\n"), 
writeC'Held: The Ds must be judged according to the knowledge of a\n")， 
write(" reasonable doctor at the time of the act.\n"), 
readanykey. 
display—case一detail( "ross_caunters "):-
write("Ross v Caunters [[980] Ch 297\n\n")， 
write("Facts: D solicitors prepared a will for a client, failing to tell the\n"), 
write(" client that the will should not be witnessed by the\n"), 
write(" beneficiary's husband. The testator died, and when the\n"), 
write(" beneficiary could not take under the will, she claimed dam\n"), 
write(" ages from the solicitors.\n\n"), 
write("Held: D held liable. The existence of this proximate relationship\n"), 
write(" justified applying the test for duty of care laid down in Anns\n"), 
write(" rather than the 'special relationship' laid down in Hedley\n"), 
write(" Byrne. \n"), 
readanykey. 
display一case一 detail(11 say ers一harlow "):-
writeC'Sayersv Harlow UDC [1958] 2 All E.R.342\n\n"), 
write("Facts: P, locked in a public lavatory, tried to climb out over the\n"), 
write(M door by stepping on the toilet roll attachment. The roll\n"), 
write(" holder revolved causing her to slip and fall.\n\n"), 
write("Held: It was found that the attempt to escape was reasonable, butNn"), 
write(" that the means of attempted escape involved some\n"), 
write(" carelessness, and the damages were reduced by one quarter.Xn"), 
readanykey. 
display一case—detail( “ scott_london "):-
write("Scottv London & Katherine's Dock [1865] 3 H&C 596\n\n"), 
write("Facts: information unavailable\n\n"), 
write("Held: There must be reasonable evidence of negligence. But\n"), 
write(" where the thing is shown to be under the management of the D\n"), 
write(" or his servants, and the accident is such as in the ordinary\n"), 
write(" course of things does not happen if those who have the\n"), 
write(" management use proper care, it affords reasonable evidence,\n"), 
write(" in the absence of explanation by the Ds, that the accident\n"), 
write(" arose from want of. care.\n"), 
readanykey. 
display一case_detail( “ smith_baker “):-
writeC'Smith'v Baker & Soias [1891] A.C.325\n\n"), 
write("Facts: P employee was employed to drill holes in rock, and as\n"), 
write(" he worked, cranes lifted rubble overhead. P was aware of the\n"), 
write(" danger, but continued with the job and was hit by a rock.\n\n"), 
write("Held: Mere knowledge of the risk does not necessarily involve\n"), 
write(" consent to the risk. The worker was concentrating on the\n"), 
write(" drilling and did not know the crane was overhead.\n"), 
read一any key • 
display_case_detail(" smith一leech "):-
write(wSmith"v Leech Brain & Co. Ltd. [1962] 2 Q.B. 405\n\n"), 
write("Facts: While P was operating a crane, a piece of molten metalXn"), 
write(" splashed out of a tank and burned his lip. P's susceptibility\n"), 
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write(" to cancer turned the burn into cancer killing P's husband.\n\n"), 
write("Held: The Wagon Mound foreseeability test was whether the D\n"), 
write(" could have foreseen that as a result of his negligence the\n"), 
write(" worker would suffer a burnAn"), 
readanykey. 
display一case—detail( “ spartan一alloys"): • “ 
write("Spartan Steel v Alloys Ltd. v Martin & Co. (Contractors) Ltd.\n"), 
write(" [1973] Q.B. 27\n\n"), 
write("Facts: P's electricity supply was cut off due to D's negligence。\n")， 
write(" Hence, oxygen was pumped into P's molten metal to\n"), 
write(" prevent solidifying, reducing the metal's value.\n\n"), 
write("Held: allowing the appeal, that P could only recover for the\n"), 
write(" physical damage to the melt in progress, plus loss of profit\n"), 
write(" on that melt.\n"), 
readanykey. 
display case一detail(“stokes guest"):-
write("Stokes v Guest, Keen & Nettlefold (Bolts and Nuts) Ltd. [1968]\n"), 
write(" 1 W.L.R. 1776\n\n"), 
write("Facts: P, a toolsetter died of cancer contracted through long term\n"), 
write(" contact with oil. A reasonable employer would not have\n"), 
write(" known of the cancer risk but the company doctor would.Nn")， 
write("Held: The presumed knowledge of the doctor could be imputed to\n")， 
write(" the employers. Such an employer would have taken steps to\n")， 
write(" avoid risk.\n"), 
read_any_key. 
display_case_detail( “ vacwellbdh "):-
write("Vacwell Engineering Co. Ltd. v B.D.H. Chemicals Ltd. [1971]\n")， 
write(" 1 Q.B. 88\n\n"), 
write("Facts: Ps manufacturers were using a chemical prepared by the\n"), 
write(" Ds. The harmful chemical's reaction to water was unknown.\n"), 
write(" When the labels were washed, a violent explosion occurred.\n11), 
write("Held: An explosion of a minor kind was foreseeable but that\n"), 




writeC'Videan v British Transport Commission [1963] 2 All E.R. 860\n\n"), 
write("Facts: P's husband—the stationmaster~saw his son sitting on a\n"), 
write(" railway line and a motorised trolley was approaching. He\n"), 
write(" threw himself in front of the trolley to save his son and was\n"), 
write(" killed.\n\n"), 
write("Held: allowing her appeal, that a duty was owed to her husband.\n"), 
write(" It was foreseeable that a stationmaster might well be on the\n"), 
write(" trackcarrying out his duties.\n"), 
readanykey. 
display_case一detail(" wagon"):-
writeC'Wagon Mound (No 1) [1961] A.C. 388\n\n"), 
write("Facts: P owners of a wharf were welding a ship. D's ship was\n")， 
write(M leaking furnace oil into the water. Receiving expert advise,\n"), 
write(" Ps continued but the oil did catch fire, destroying the wharf.\n\n"), 
write("Held: allowing the appeal，that the Ds were not liable. The Ps in\n"), 
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write(" this case could not argue that the Ds should reasonably have\n"), 
write(" foreseen fire as a type of damage，because of advice received.\n"), 
read一any一key. 
display 一case—detail("watt—hertfordshire"):-
write("Watt v Hertfordshire County Council [1954] 1 W。L。R. 835\n\n"), 
write("Facts: D fire service went to the rescue of a woman trapped\n"), 
write(" under a heavy vehicle. Loading a jack on a make-shift truck,\n")? 
write(" the P fireman was injured when the jack rolled. \n\n"), 
write("Held: dismissing the appeal, that the Ds were not negligent in\n"), 
write(" sending out the jack unsecured. The saving of life and limb\n")， 
write(" justified a considerable risk being taken.\n"), 
read any key. 
display_case_detail( “ wells一cooper "):-
write(HWells~v Cooper [1958] 2 Q.B. 265\n\n"), 
write("Facts: The D, a home carpenter, repaired a door handle in his\n"), 
write(" house, but used screws insufficient for the purpose. The P\n"), 
write(" visitor fell back and was injured when the handle came off.\n"), 
write("Held: allowing the appeal, that the D was not liable. The degree\n"), 
write(" of care and skill required of a householder was that of a\n")， 
write(" reasonably skilled amateur carpenterAn"), 
read any key. 
display—case_detail("wheeler_copas"):-
writeC'WheeTer v Copas [198一 1] 3 All E.R’ 405\n\n"), 
write("Facts: P bricklayer was working on the D's farm. Using a borrowed\n"), 
write(" farmer ladders for carrying heavy equipment the ladder gave\n")， 
write(" way and P was injured. P sued the farmer.\n\n")， 
write("Held: P was a professional bricklayer should not have chosen to\n"), 
write(" use the farmer's ladder. Damages were reduced by 50% to\n"), 
write(" take into account the P's contributory negligence.\n"), 
readanykey. 
display一case一detail( "whitehousej ordan "):-
write("Whitdiouse v Jordan [1981] 1 W丄.R. 246\n\n"), 
write("Facts: A baby suffered brain damage during delivery. The doctor.\n"), 
write(" was found to have fallen below the very high standard of\n"), 
write(" professional competence the law requires.\n\n"), 
write("Held: The standard does allow for some errors of judgment.\n"), 
readanykey. 
display_case_detail(" wilsheressex"):-
write("Wilsher v Essex Area—Health Authority [1987] Q.B. 730\n\n"), 
write("Facts: P child was bora three months prematurely. Extra oxygen\n"), 
write(" was given to ensure his survival. As a result, he was rendered\n"), 
write(" blind. The baby was treated by a recently qualified doctor.\n\n"), 
write("Held: The inexperienced doctor could have seeked advice from\n"), 
write(" his superiors, avoiding the tragedy. On the facts, the doctor\n"), 
write(" had not reached the standard of the specialistAn"), 
read—any key. 
display一case一detail(" wimpey_poole"): _ 
write("Wimpey Construction v Poole [1984] 2 Lloyd's Rep 499\n\n"), 
write("Facts: A professional engineer held himself out as having\n"), 
write(" especially high skills, and was hired on that basis. The\n"), 
write(" court was asked to determine whether a structure had been\n")， 
write(" negligently designed.\n\n"), 
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write("Held: The standard of care was that of the ordinary skilled person\n"), 
write(" exercising and professing to have professional skill，not that\n"), 
write(" of a person professing to have especially high professional\n"), 
write(" skills. The standard of the ordinary reasonably engineer was\n"), 





/* Help Screens */ 
display_help_detail( "beginning "):-
writeC'XnXnNo Help Available\n\n"), 
read—any一key. 
display一help 一detail( “ screen "):-
write("\nScreening Cases\n\n"), 
write("screens out cases that are not product/liability cases，or cases\n"), 
write("that were brought forward after the limitation period, or cases\n")， 
write("with ineligible types of damages.\n")， 
read any key。 
display_help_detail(" dutyofcare"):-
write(nW)uty of Care\n\i?)， 
write(" establishing the duty of care the defendant owed to the plaintiff\n"), 
write("by proving that there was a sufficient proximity between the\n"), 
write("plaintiff and the defendant according to the Neighbor Principal.\n"), 
write("Policy considerations are also taken into account to see if scope\n"), 
write("of the duty is negated or reduced in any ways.Xn")， 
read any key. 
display_help_detail(11 breach—of一duty "):-
write("^iBreach of Duty\n\n"), 
write("proving that the defendant indeed breached the duty of care owed\n"), 
write("to the plaintiff. Two premises are being looked at: whether the\n"), 
write("risk of damage was foreseeable and whether the risk was an\n"), 
write("unreasonable risk to take. If both premises turn out to be true,\n"), 
write("the breach of duty can be established.\n"), 
readanyjkey. 
display一help_detail( “ causation "):-
write(" \nCausation\n\n"), 
write("proving that the damage suffered by the plaintiff was the result of\n"), 
write("the defendant's breach of duty. One question will be asked of the\n"), 
write("plaintiff: If not for the defendant's action/inaction, would the\n"), 
write("plaintiff have suffered damage? 'No1 would imply causation.\n\n11), 
write("In addition, simultaneous causes and successive injuries need to\n"), 
write("be considered as well. Any intervening events in the process of\n"), 
write("injuries cannot break the chain of causation if causation is to be\n"), 
write( “ established. \n “)， 
read any key. 
display一help一detail( “ remoteness")：今 
write("\nRemoteness of Damage\n\n"), 
write("proving that there is a legal connection between the act/omission\n"), 
write("and the damage by verifying that the kind of damage was\n"), 
write(11 foreseeable regardless of the extent of damage. \n"), 
read any key. 
display—help—detail (" defense"):: 
write("\nDefendant1 s Defense\n\n"), 
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write("provides the defendant a chance to rebut by attributing a share of\n"), 
write("blame to the plaintiff using 'contributory negligence' and 'voluntary\n"), 




/* Screen Cases Module */ 
/•Database 


















/* —…” */ 
/* Screen Cases by Scope */ 
/ * % — ——，-、— */ 
screen scope:， 
/* Making sure user knows the scope of the system */ 
position一 title， 
write(" < < < Screening Cases > > > ")， 
positiontext, 
write("This Expert System examines Product/Service Liability cases"), 
advance一two—lines， 
write("in which the plaintiffs allegedly claim damages from the"), 
advance_two_lines, 
write("manufacturers because of consumption of a product/service"), 
advance two lines， 








/* -———女——―”-…——-f. ———-*/ 
/* Screen Cases by Limitation Period */ 
/*__—_‘ 一麵 „— */ 
limitation_period:-
position一 title， 
write(" < < < Limitation Period for Product/Service Liability cases > > >\n\n"), 
positiontext, 
write("The Limitation Period is either:-\n\n"), 
write("(l) 6 years from the date on which the cause of action\n"), 
write(" accrued, that is，the time when the damage was done;\n\n")， 
write("or\n\n"), 
write("(2) 3 years after the plaintiff has the knowledge required\n"), 
write(" for bringing an action in respect of the damage, that is，\n")， 
write(" the time when the plaintiff has knowledge of the facts of\n"), 
write(" the damage and the identity of the producer, etc.\n\n"), 
write("Whichever period is later.\n"), 
write("(Section 31 of the Limitaion Ordinance, Cap.347 of the laws of Hong Kong)\n\n"), 





/* — — ——*/ 




write("Only certain types of damages can give rise to an action in negligence\n"), 
position text， 
push_case(j unior_veitchi)， 
write(11 Categories of damage suffered by the plaintiff in this case:\n"), 
write(" 1. Personal injury such as damage to life and limb, loss of enjoyment\n"), 
write(" of life, loss of expectation of life and pain and sufferingVn"), 
write(" 2. Nervous shockNn")， 
write(" 3. Damage to property such as machinery being wrecked in an explosion\n")， 
write(" happened in a factory\n"), 
write(" 4. Pure economic loss which is TRULY consequent on personal or\n"), 
write(" property injury suffered by the plaintiff, such as loss of\n"), 
write(" earnings, loss of profit in the sale of damaged products.\n"), 
write(" 5. Special case of pure economic loss which is not accompanied by\n"), 
write(" any personal or property injury suffered by the plaintiff. In\n"), 
write(" such case, the plaintiff should have specially relied on the\n"), 
write(" skill and expertise of the defendant An"), 
write(" (Junior Books v Veitchi [1982] 3 All ER 201).\n"), 
write— 6.-Others\n\n"), 
write("Select:")， 
read_selection(Tod_reply, '0'，'7 •)，!， 






DT= ,1 , , !7 
asserta(damage_type(personal_inj ury)). 
rememberdamagetype(DT):-
DT='2 ' j7 
asserta(damage一 type(nervous—shock))。 
remember一damage—type(DT):-






asserta(damage一 type(special—economic一 loss))。 
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Duty, pro 
/* Duty of Care Module */ 
predicates 
/* Duty of Care */ 
duty一of一care一title 














/* Duty of Care */ 
duty—of care—title:-
position title， 







write("\n\n*** Duty of Care ESTABLISHED ***")， 
pausecontinue. 
duty 一 o f — c a r e : -




duty of care title， 
pushcase(annslondon)， 
push^case(donoghuestevenson), 
write("Duty of care exists if there is a sufficient proximity between\n"), 
write("the plaintiff and the defendant according to the Neigbor Principal.\n"), 
write("(Donoghue v Stevenson [1932] A.C.562)\nn")， 
write("Under Neighbor Principal, the defendant must take reasonable care\n"), 
write("to avoid acts or omissions which he can reasonably foresee would be\n"), 
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write(11 likely to injure his neighbors, the persons who are closely and directly\n"), 
write("affected by his act.\n"), 
write("(Anns v London Mertori Borough Council [1977] 2 All E.R. 492)\n\n"), 






















damage_type(special 一 e c o n o m i c — l o s s )， 
handleSEL. 
sufficient_proximlty: - /* Rescuer case */ 
duty 一 o f 一 care—title， 
handle rescuer. 





handle PI DP:- /* Personal Injury and Damage to Property */ 
push_case(home_dorset)， 
push一case(donoghue一 stevenson)， 
write("For personal injuries and damage to property suffered by the\n"), 
write("plaintiff as a result of the defendant's act, the foresight of\n"), 
write("damage will be sufficient to establish the necessary proximity.\n"), 
write("(Refer to : Donoghue v Stevenson [1932] A.C.562\n"), 
write(" Home Office v Dorset Yacht Co. [1970] A.C. 1004)\n\n"), 






handle一NerveS:- /* Nervous Shock */ 
write("In the case of Nervous Shock, because 'shock" in its nature\n"), 
write("is capable of affecting so wide a range of people，a real need\n"), 
write("for the law to place some limitation upon the extent of admissible\n"), 
write("claims. It is necessary to consider :-\n\n"), 
write("(l) The class of persons whose claim should be recognised. The\n"), 
write(" closer the tie of the persons, the greater the claim for\n"), 
write(" consideration, for example，husband and wife, parent and child.\n\n"), 
write(" Given this, does the plaintiff have a close tie to the persons\n"), 
write(" involved in the case? (y/n)")， 
read_yes_no(YorN)，！， 
YorN= 'y',nl,nl, 
write("(2) The proximity of such persons to the accident.\n\n"), 
write(" The plaintiff was close to the persons in the accident in\n"), 




write("(3) The means by which the shock was caused. The shock mustAn")， 
write(" come through sight or hearing of the event or of its immediate、!!")， 
write(" aftermath. (McLoughlin v O'Brian [1983] 2 W丄.R.982)\n\n")， 
write— Is it true for this case? (t/f)")， 
read—true_false(TorF 1)，!， 
popcase, 
TorFl = 't'. 
handle—PEL:- /* Pure Economic Loss */ 
pushcase(spartanmartin)， 
write-in the case of PURE ECONOMIC LOSS which was truly\n")， 
write(11 consequent on personal injury or property damage, duty\n"), 
write("of care exist when damage is foreseeable.\n"), 
write("(Spartan Steel v Martin [1972] 3 W丄.R.502\n\n")， 




handle NegStat:- /* Negligent Statements */ 





write("In the case of negligently made statements, since the harmfiil\n"), 
write("effects of a statement can carry much further than the effects\n"), 
write("of an act, stringent limitations have been placed on the notice\n"), 
write("of proximity. There must be special relationship between the\n"), 
write("plaintiff and the defendantAn"), 
write("(Hedley Byrne and Co. Ltd, v Heller and Partners Ltd. [1964] A.C.465"), 
pause_continue, 
pop 一 c a s e ， 
handle_NS. 
handle一NS:- /* Negligent Statements */ 
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duty—of care title， 
write("Was there a contractual relationship? (y/n)")， 
read_yes_no(YorN)， 
YorN = 'y'. 
handleNS:-
nl，nl， 










write("The statement was being relied upon and that the informer\n"), 





push一case(mutual 一 e v a t t )， 
write("A particular relationship was created, e.g. the defendant held\n"), 
write("himself out as competent to give information or advice and\n"), 
write("the circumstances had caused the defendant to realize or ought\n"), 
write("to have realized that he was being trusted by the plaintiff and\n"), 
write("the plaintiff intended to act upon the information or advice. \n"), 
write("(Mutual Life Citizens Assurance Co. v Evatt [1971] All E.R.150\n\n"), 






write("Was there a relationship equivalent to contract?\n"), 








write("In SPECIAL CASE of Pure Economic Loss, in order to limit\n"), 
write("the area in which economic damage may be recovered, a strict\n"), 
write("test of proximity should be used, which effectively narrows the\n"), 
write(11 class of plaintiffs eligible to recover financial loss.\n\n"), 
write("A defendant will owe a duty of care and therefore be liable\n"), 
write(Mfor economic damage due to his negligent conduct when\n"), 
write("he can reasonable foresee that a specific individual, as distinct\n"), 
write("from a general class of persons, will suffer financial loss as\n"), 
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write("a consequence of his conduct.\n"), 
write("(Caltex Oil Ltd. v The Dredge Willemstad [1976] 11 A.L.R. 227\n"), 
write— Ross v Caunters [1980] ch 297)\n\n"), 
write(11 Given this, can the defendant of the case reasonably foresee\n"), 





handle一SEL:- /* Special Economic Loss */ 
duty一of_care一title， 
push_case(j unior一veitchi)， 
write飞"In SPECIA1. CASE of Pure Economic Loss，\n")， 
write("Was there an exceptionally close proximity between the\n"), 
write(" plaintiff and the defendant in that the plaintiff relied on the\n"), 
write(" skills and expertise of the defendant?\n"), 





handle—rescuer:- /* Rescuer */ 
push一case(videan—british)， 
push_case(haynes_harwood)， 
write("Was the plaintiff a RESCUER to a person suffered personal\n"), 
write("injuries or property damage as a result of the defendant's act?\n"), 
write("(Refer to : Haynes v Harwood [1935] 1 K.B.146\n"), 
write(" Videan v British Transport Commission [1963] 2 All E.R.860)\n"), 
write("(y/n)")， 
read_yes_no(YorN)，！， 






write("Was the product dangerous to the consumer's life or property?\n"), 







write("Existence of certain policy issues may negate or reduce\n"), 
write("or limit the scope of duty or the class of persons to whom\n"), 




write("Is there a possibility of a floodgate claims?\n"), 
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write("Will the defendants be liable for enormous amounts which\n"), 
write("are disproportionate to the fault caused?\n"), 




Y o r b y . 
Breach, pro 
/* Breach of Duty Module */ 
predicates 
/* Breach of Duty */ 
breachofduty 
breach—foreseeability一title 
breach rules title 
breach_risk_to_take_title 
risk一of一damage_text 
risk—of damage foreseeable 
rules一 affecting一 foreseeability 
rulestext 
rule(integer) 


















write(" < < < Breach Of Duty - Rules affecting the Foreseeability Standard > > > ")， 
position一 text: 
breach一risk to take title:-
position title， 
write(" < < < Breach Of Duty - Reasonable Risk to Take > > > ")， 
position text. 
/* Rules Affecting the Foreseeability of risk of damage */ 
rule(l):- /* likelihood of risk */ 
push一case(bolton一 stone)， 
write("The degree of care varies directly with the risks\n"), 
write("involved; the higher the degree of probability that\n"), 
write("damage will be done, the higher the degree of care\n"), 
writeC'requireci. (Bolton v Stone [1951] 1 All E.R. 11078)")； 
rule(2):- /* knowledge */ 
push一 case(unknown), 
write("It is knowledge of the reasonable person, not the knowledge\n"), 
write("of the tortfeasor—defendant—which must determine foreseeability."). 
rule(3):- /* greater knowledge */ 
pushcase(stokesguest)， 
write("If the tortfeasor~defendant~has greater knowledge than the\n"), 
write("reasonable person, the tortfeasor must meet the standard of\n"), 
write("the reasonable person with that extra knowledge. \n11), 
write("(Stokes v Guest, Keen & Nettlefold [1968] 1 W丄.R.1776)")• 
mle(4):- /* knowledge at the time of act */ 
push一case(roe—minister)， 
write("It is the knowledge of the reasonable person at the time of the\n"), 
write("act which is relevant, not the knowledge at the time oAn"), 
write("trial. (Roe v Minister of Health [1954] 2 All E.R. 131)"). 
rule(5):- /* skill */ 
push_case(bolam_friern)， 
push_case(wimpey_poole)， 
write("It is the skill of the reasonable person and not the skill\n"), 
write("of the tortfeasor—defendant—which must determine foreseeability.\n")， 
write(11 Where a person hold her or himself out to have skills above\n"), 
write("that of the reasonable person, the standard will be that oAn"), 
write("the skilled person.\n"), 
write("(Wimpey Construction v Poole [1984] 2 Lloyd's Rep 499,\n"), 
write(" Bolam v Friera Hospital [1957] 2 All E.R. 118)"). 
rule(6):-/* errors of judgement */ 
push_case(whitehouseJ ordan)， 
write("Even the higher standard of the professional is not an absolute\n"), 
write("standard. The reasonable professional will still make mistakes.\n"), 
write("(Whitehouse v Jordan [1981] 1 W.L.R. 246)"). 
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rule(7):- /* common practice */ 
push一case(luxmore messenger)， 
push_case(edwardj ohnson), 
write("An indicator of what a reasonable person in a trade or profession\n"), 
write("might do is the common practice in that trade or profession.Xn"), 
write(" Common practice however is not conclusive as to reasonableness. \n"), 
write—(Edward Wong Finance Co. Ltd. v Johnson Stokes & Master [1984] 2 W.L.R. l，\n")， 
write(" Luxmore-May v Messenger may & Baverstock [1990] 1 All E.R. 1067 at 1075-1076)"). 
rule(8):- /* conflicting practices */ 
push_case(bolam_friern)， 
write(11 Where there are varying practices within a trade or profession,\n"), 
write("a member of the profession need only follow a practice accepted\n"), 
write("as proper by a responsible body of the members of the profession. \n"), 
write("(Bolam v Friern Hospital [1957] 2 All E.R. 118)"). 
rule(9):- /* beginners */ 
push_case(wilsher_essex), 
push_case(nettleship_weston)， 
write("A learner training for a skill，trade or profession must meet\n"), 
write("the same standard as a skilled person.\n"), 
write("(Nettleship v Weston [1971] 2 Q.B. 691,\n"), 
write�" Wilsher v Essex Area Health Authority [1986] Q.B. 730)"). 
rule(10):- /* amateurs */ 
push case(wells一cooper)， 
write(11 Amateurs are held to a half way standard, higher than that of the\n"), 
write("reasonable untrained person, yet lower than the standard of the\n"), 
write("professional. (Wells v Cooper [1958] 2 Q.B. 265)"). 
rule(ll):- /* children */ 
pushcase(mchalewatson)， 
write("A child is expected to meet the standard of the reasonable person\n"), 
write("at that age. When a defendant ceases to be a child is unclear.\n"), 
write("(McHale v Watson [1965-66] 38 ALJR 266)"). 
rule(12):- /* handicapped */ 
push_case(insurancej oyce)， 
write("If a handicapped person has taken on a task which requires\n"), 
write( "particular expertise, then that person is holding him or herself\n"), 
write("out to have the required skills, and should be held to that standard.\n"), 
write(11 (Insurance Commissioner v Joyce [1948] 77 C.L.R. 39)"). 




NOT(reasonable一risk一to 一 take)，！， 
write("\n\n*** Defendant has BREACHED duty ofcare ***"), 
pause_continue. 
breachof一duty:-





risk_of damage text， 
rules_affecting_foreseeability, ！， 
write(,,\n\n***~Risk of Damage is FORESEEABLE ***"), 
pause continue. 
riskofdamageforeseeable:-
write("\n\n*** Risk of Damage is NOT foreseeable ***")， 
pause一continue， 
fail."“ 
risk of damage text:-
breach_foreseeability_title, 
write("To prove that defendant has breached the duty of care owed\n"), 
write("to the plaintiff, the foreseeability of the risk of damage needs\n"), 
write("to be established. \n\n11), 
write("To judge the foreseeability of the risk of damage, user needs to take the\n"), 
write(11 position of a reasonable man.\n\n"), 
write("Consider the STANDARD OF FORESIGHT of the reasonable man who is\n"), 
write("free from over-apprehension or over-confidence, and\n"), 
write(" independent of the idiosyncrasies (peculiarities) of the\n"), 




display all rules. 
rules text:-
breach一rules_title， 
write("In a while, you will be shown 12 rules that may affect the\n"), 
write("STANDARD OF FORESIGHT required of the defendant.\n\n"), 
write("You will be asked of the applicability of each rule and whether\n"), 
write("the defendant should be able to foresee the risk of damage\n"), 
writeC'when the rule is applied.\n\n"), 
write("Bear in mind that each rule has its exceptional issues. So for\n"), 
write("best estimation, the risk of damage is foreseeable when all\n"), 








































write("\n\nHow applicable is this rule in this case?\n"), 
write(" 1. ApplicableNn")， 




write("\n\nWhen this rule is applied, should the defendant be able to\n"), 
write( “ foresee the risk of damage? (y/n)")， 
read_y esno(YorN), ！， 
trace(on), 
Y o r N = y . 
rule applicable. /* rule not applicable */ 
reasonable—risk一to—take:-
breach一risk一to—take一title， 
write(" After proving that the risk of injury or damage is foreseeable,\n"), 
write("we need to ask the question: whether a reasonable person in the\n"), 





not(s]ubstantial gravity of injury)，!， 









substantial gravity of inj ury:-
breach一risk to take title， 
push_case(paris一 stepney)， 
write("Considering the gravity of injury should the risk eventuate,\n"), 
write("can you say that the risk is substantial?\n"), 
write("(Paris v Stepney Borough Council [1951] A.C.367)\n\n"), 
write("(y/n)")， 




breach risk—to take一title， 
pushcase(latimeraec)， 
push_case(haley_london)， 
write("Was there a difficulty in eliminating the risk?\n"), 
write("(Haley v London Electricity Board [1965] A.C.778\n")， 







breach risk to一take title， 
push_case(watt_hertfordshire), 
write("Was there a usefulness of the defendant's conduct and any\n")， 
write("possible justification for taking the risk?\n"), 




Rj reply ='y'. 
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Causatio.pro 
/* Causation Module */ 
predicates 
/* Causation */ 
causation title 
causation 
but for test 
simultaneous causes 






negligent act by 3 rd_party 
deliberateactby 一3 rd_party 
foreseeable intervening act 
clauses 
/* Causation */ 
causation:“ 
changehelptext(causation)， 
but for test， 
simultaneous一causes， 
successive inj uries， 
not(break_in_chain), /* Novus Actus Interveniens */ 
writeCNnNnCausation is ESTABLISHED.")， 
pause一continue. 
causation:-











write("But for Test\n\n"), 
write("If it was NOT for the defendant's action/inaction,\n"), 
write("would the plaintiff have suffered damage?\n"), 
write—*** NO would imply causation ***\n\n"), 
write("(Barnett v Chelsea Hospital [1969] 1 All E.R. 1068,\n"), 
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write( "Using common sense and considering all of the possible\n"), 
write("reasonable persons involved, should the defendant be held liable?\n"), 
write("(Fitzgerald v Lane [1987] 2 All E.R.455\n\n"), 
write("(y/n)")， 
read_yes_no(Sc 1 reply)，！， 
pop 一case, 
Scl_reply='y'. 
simultaneous一causes. /* no simultaneous causes */ 
successiveinj uries:-
causation一title， 





write("Using policy appropriate for the circumstances, should the\n"), 
write("original tortfeasor—the defendant-continue to be liable for the\n"), 
writeC'injury subsumed by the greater damage resulting from the second\n"), 
write—event?\n")， 
write(" (Baker v Willoughby [1969] All E.R.1528)\n\n"), 
write("(y/n)")， 
read_yes_no(Si 1 reply)，！， 
pop—case, 
Sil_reply='y'. 
successive一injuries. /* no successive一injuries */ 
break一in一 chain:-
causation一title， 




write(、n\n*** Break In Chain Of Causation ESTABLISHED ***")， 
pause continue. 
breakin—chain:-




handle一IE:- /* Intervening Event */ 
natural event, 
handle_IE:‘ /* Intervening Event */ 
innocent一act by_plaintiff. 
handle一IE:- /* Intervening Event */ 
negligent一act_by_plaintiff. 
handle一IE:- /* Intervening Event */ 
negligent_act_by_3 rd_party. 
handle—IE:- /* Intervening Event */ 
deliberate一act—by—3 rd_party. 




write( "Break in Chain of Causation\n\n"), 





writeC'Is it true thafthe defendant's breach of duty had NEITHER\n"), 
write("increased the likelihood that the plaintiff would suffer damage\n"), 
write("from the intervening natural event NOR rendered him more\n"), 
write("susceptible to the damage? 'TRUE' would imply a break in chain\n")， 
write("of causation.\n\n"), 




Ne f reply = ! t ' . 
innocent一actbyjplaintiff:-
causation一title, 




write("Was plaintiffs innocent intervening act an unreasonable\n"), 
write("reponse to the defendant's negligence?\n\n"), 
write(H(y/n)")， 








Nabp reply ='y',! , 
pushcase(mckewholland)， 
write(,,Did plaintiff's negligent intervening act that followed defendant's\n"), 
write("negligence cause extra damage?\n\n"), 
write("(McKew v Holland [1969] 3 All E.R。1621，1623)\n\n"), 
write("(y/n)")， 
read_yes_no(Nabp 1 reply)，！， 
pop 一 c a s e , 
Nabplreply='y'。 
negligent act by 3 rd_party:-
causation title， 
write("Was there a NEGLIGENT intervening act by a THIRD party? (y/n)")， 
read_y es一no(Nab3p—reply)， 
advance_two—lines， 
Nab3p 一reply = 'y1，!， 
push_case(lord_pacific)， 
write("Was the negligent act of the third party unwarrantable and\n"), 
write("unreasonable, creating a new cause to disturb the sequence\n"), 
write—of events?\n")， 
write("(Lord v Pacific Steam-The Oropesa [1943] 1 All E.R.211 at 214)\n\n"), 
write("(y/n)")， 











write("In the case of a deliberate intervening act by a third party,\n"), 
write("courts have been most reluctant to find the defendant liable\n")， 
write("for the deliberate acts of third parties, even where the third\n"), 
write("parties' acts could have been considered foreseeable.\n\n"), 
write("(Perl Exporters v Camden [1983] Q.B.342\n"), 







pusl\_case(knightley J ohns)， 
write("Can a reasonable person foresee the intervening act as one\n"), 
writeC'of a class of foreseeable acts likely to arise from the\n")， 
write("original negligence? NO would imply break in chain of\n"), 
write(" causation. \n\n")， 
write("(Knightley v Johns [1982] 1 W丄.R.349，365\n"), 
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I l l 
Remote, pro 
/* Remoteness of Damage Module */ 
predicates 




/* Remoteness of Damage */ 
remoteness title:-
position一title， 









write("Regardless of the extent of damage-thin skull rule~was\n"), 
write("the kind of damage foreseeable? YES would imply damageW1)， 
write("NOT remote.XnXn"), 
write—(Wagon Mound (No 1) [1961] A.C.388\n"), 
write(" Smith v Leech Brain [1961] 2 Q.B.405\n"), 







write("\n\n*** Damage was NOT remote ***")， 
pausecontinue. 
remoteness 一 o f 一 damage:-




/* Defendant's Defense Module */ 
112 
predicates 
/* Defendant's Defense */ 
defendant defense 
defense—title 
defense cn title 
defense volenti title 
defense_alternatives(char) 
provedefense 
prove contributory negligence 
contributorynegligence 
plaintiff contributed 
court apportion damages 














/* Defendant's Defense */ 
defensetitle:-
position_title, 













write("Burden of proof of establishing a defense is on the defendant.\n\n"), 
write(“ Alternatives available: \n\n")， 
write(" 1. Contributoiy Negligence\n"), 
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write(" or Volenti non fit injuria—Voluntary Assumption of Risk\n"), 
write(" 2. Defendant has NO defbnse。\n\n")， 
write("Select:")， 
read_selection(Dd_reply，' 0'，' 3')， 
defense一altematives(Dd reply)，！， 
write("\"ii\n*** Defendant's Defense is ESTABLISHED ***")， 
read_any一key。 
defendant defense: - /* no defense */ 
write(7\n\n*** Defendant's Defense CANNOT be established ***")， 
pause一 continue， 










prove volenti non—fit inj uria. 
prove_contributory 一negligence:-
contributory negligence, 
write("\n\n*** Plaintiffs Contributory Negligence is established ***"), 
pausecontinue. 
prove一contributory—negligence:-
writeC'XnNn*** Plaintiffs Contributory Negligence CANNOT be established ***")， 
pause一continue, 
fa i l . " 
provevolentinonfitinjuria:-
volenti non fit injuria, 
writeC'XnXn^** Plaintiff's Volenti Non Fit Injuria is established ***")， 
pause一continue. 
prove volenti non_fit—injuria:-







write("To determine the existence of contributory negligence, the\n"), 
write("standard applied to the plaintiff is that of the reasonable person\n"), 
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write("in all the circumstances of the case.\n"), 
write("(Sayers v Harlow UDC [1958] 2 All E.R。342)\n\n")， 
write("If the plaintiff has particular knowledge and skill, the standard\n"), 
write("to be applied is that of the person with that knowledge or skill.\n"), 
















write("The negligence of the plaintiff contributed to the injury or damage.\n"), 
write("(Caswell v Powell Duffryn Associated Collieries [1939] A.C. 152，175\n"), 








write("Did defendant put plaintiff in a dilemma such that the plaintiff\n"), 
write(11 acted reasonably but injured him or herself attempting to avoid greater\n"), 







write(" Courts are unlikely to find that a rescuer was contributorily\n"), 
write("negligent in going to a rescue and exposing him or herself to danger.\n"), 
write("(Caswell v Powell Duffryn Collieries [1940] A.C. 152，175)\n\n"), 














write(,,\n\nWas the child of an age where it is reasonable to expect him\n"), 
write("or her to take precautions for his or her own safety? YES would\n")， 
write("imply the child is guilty of contributory negligence. Note, however,\n"), 
write("that Hong Kong courts appear to have expected a greater degree of \n"), 
write("responsibility on the part of children。\n\n")， 
write("(Liu Tat-chor v Liu Fook-tim [1974] Civ App No 46\n"), 
write(" Cheung Yuk-chun v Mitsui Construction [1985] 15 HKU 112\n"), 
write(" Lam Yuen-wan v Tai Kam-tong HCA [1979] H.C.A. No 5443)\n"), 
write("(y/n)")， 









write("The plaintiff failed to take reasonable care of his own safety?\n"), 






write("\n\nPlaintiff could have reasonably foreseen the harm to himself?\n"), 














write("Last Opportunity Rule\n\n"), 
write("(Lloyds Bank Ltd, vBudd [1982] R。T.R.80)\n\n")， 
write("Did the defendant have the last opportunity to avoid the accident?\n"), 




pop 一 c a s e ， 
Lor_reply='y'. 
last opportunity rule:-
write("\n\nls it true that the defendant could have avoided the accident\n"), 







write("Taking into account the degree of contributory negligence,\n"), 
write("will the court apportion damages as it thinks fit by referring to the\n"), 






write(11 Since the statutory reform to contributory negligence, the courts\n"), 
write("will only find volenti in extreme cases, probably where there is some\n"), 





write(,,\n\nCourts are reluctant to find that a rescuer or a workman acts\n"), 
write(" voluntarily. \n")， 
write("(Haynes v Harwood [1935] 1 K.B.147)\n\n"), 











write("\n\nMere knowledge of the danger does not necessarily imply consent. \n\n"), 
write("Is it true that plaintiff ONLY had mere knowledge of the danger?\n"), 






plaintiff acceptance: _ 





writeC'^Xnls it true that the agreement was obtained by fraud, duress, or moral duty?\n"), 






write("\n\nDid the agreement contain a REASONABLE exclusion or limitation clause?\n"), 
write(" (Buckpitt v Oates [1968] 1 All E.R.1145)\n")， 
write("(y/n)")， 
read_yes_no(Pa2_reply)，！， 
pop 一 case, 
Pa2_reply=ly', 
write("\n\nls it true that the plaintiff had a choice as to whether to tke the risk?\n"), 
write("(t/f)")， 
read_true_false(Pa3_reply)， 
Pa3—reply W . 
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